Perspectives of risk sharing by Aase, Knut K.
Perspectives of Risk Sharing
Knut K. Aase

Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration
5035 Sandviken - Bergen, Norway
May, 2000
Abstract
In this paper we present an overview of the standard risk sharing
model of insurance. We discuss and characterize a competitive equilib-
rium, Pareto optimality, and representative agent pricing, including its
implications for insurance premiums. We only touch upon the existence
problem of a competitive equilibrium, primarily by presenting several ex-
amples. Risk tolerance and aggregation is the subject of one section. Risk
adjustment of the probability measure is one topic, as well as the insurance
version of the capital asset pricing model.
The competitive paradigm may be a little demanding in practice, so we
alternatively present a game theoretic view of risk sharing, where solutions
end up in the core. Properly interpreted, this may give rise to a range of
prices of each risk, often visualized in practice by an ask price and a bid
price. The nice aspect of this is that these price ranges can be explained
by \rst principles", not relying on transaction costs or other frictions.
We end the paper by indicating the implications of our results for
a pure stock market. In particular we nd it advantageous to discuss
the concepts of incomplete markets in this general setting, where it is
possible to use results for closed, convex subspaces of an L
2
-space to
discuss optimal risk allocation problems in incomplete nancial markets.
KEYWORDS: Reinsurance Model, Equilibrium, Pareto Optimality,
Core Solution, Stock Market, Complete Model
1 Introduction
This paper is primarily a review paper, where we present the standard risk shar-
ing model of reinsurance markets. The model considered starts with a set of I
agents, interpreted as (re)insurers, each endowed with a random payo X
i
for
agent i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; I . Supposing the agents can negotiate any aordable con-
tracts among themselves, resulting in a nal portfolio Y
i
, one essential objective
is to characterize these random variable Y
i
most preferred by agent i. Other
applications are manifold, since this model is indeed very general. For instance,
X
i
might represent randomly varying water endowments, could stand for a na-
tion's quota in producing diverse pollutants, could be the initial endowment of

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shares in a stock market, e.t.c. This latter application we discuss in detail in
the last section of the paper.
We discuss and characterize a competitive equilibrium, Pareto optimality,
and representative agent pricing, including its implications for insurance premi-
ums. We only touch upon the existence problem of a competitive equilibrium,
primarily by presenting several examples. Risk tolerance and aggregation is
the subject of one section. Risk adjustment of the probability measure is one
topic, as well as the insurance version of the capital asset pricing model based
on multinormality.
The competitive paradigm may be a little demanding in practice, so we
alternatively present a game theoretic view of risk sharing, where solutions end
up in the core. Properly interpreted, this may give rise to a range of prices of
each risk, often visualized in practice by an ask price and a bid price. The nice
aspect of this is that these price ranges can be explained by \rst principles",
not relying on transaction costs or other frictions.
We end the paper by indicating the implications of our results for a pure
stock market. In particular we nd it advantageous to discuss the concepts of
incomplete markets in this general setting, where it is possible to use results
for closed, convex subspaces of an L
2
-space to discuss optimal risk allocation
problems in incomplete nancial markets.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 1 we present the basic risk-
exchange model, in section 2 we characterize a competitive equilibrium, in sec-
tion 3 we characterize a Pareto optimum, in section 4 we introduce the repre-
sentative agent, and is section 5 we discuss existence problems. Section 6 is
devoted to risk tolerance and aggregation, section 7 to insurance premiums and
section 8 to risk adjustments of the given probability measure. In section 9
we present the capital asset pricing model in insurance terms. Section 10 is a
game theoretic approach to the risk allocation problem, and we end the paper
in section 11, where the implications for a stock market of eÆcient allocation of
risks is discussed.
2 The Basic Risk-Exchange Model
In this article we study the following model: Let I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig be a group of
I reinsurers, simply termed agents for the time being, having preferences 
i
over
a suitable set of random variables, or gambles with realizations (outcomes) in
some A  R. These preferences are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility, meaning that there is a set of continuous utility indices u
i
:
R ! R, such that X 
i
Y if and only if Eu
i
(X)  Eu
i
(Y ). We assume
monotonic preferences, and risk aversion, so that, granted enough smoothness,
we have u
0
i
(w) > 0; u
00
i
(w)  0 for all w in the relevant domains.
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Sometimes
we shall also require strict risk aversion, meaning strict concavity for some u
i
.
Each agent is endowed with a random payo X
i
called his initial portfolio.
More precisely, there exists a probability space (
;F ; P ) such that i is entitled
to payo X
i
(!) when ! 2 
 occurs. This means that uncertainty is objective
and external. And there is no informational asymmetry. All parties agree upon
(
;F ; P ) as the probabilistic description of the stochastic environment, the
1
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latter being unaected by their actions. It will be convenient to posit that both
expected values and variances exist for all these initial portfolios, which means
that all X
i
2 L
2
(
;F ; P ), or just X
i
2 L
2
for short.
We suppose the agents can negotiate any aordable contracts among them-
selves, resulting in a new set of random variables Y
i
; i 2 I, representing the
possible nal payout to the dierent members of the group, or nal portfolios.
The transactions are carried out right away at \market prices", where (Y ) rep-
resents the market price for any Y 2 L
2
, i.e., it signies the group's valuation
of the random variable Y relative to the other random variables in L
2
. The
essential objective is then to determine:
(a) The market price (Y ) of any \risk" Y 2 L
2
from the set of preferences of
the agents and the joint probability distribution F (x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
I
) of the random
vector X = (X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
).
(b) For each i, the nal portfolio Y
i
most preferred by him among those
satisfying his budget constraint (Y
i
)  (X
i
).
Some observations are in order. First, observe that the possible events F =
F
X
:= (X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) is the sigma-eld generated by the initial random
variables X , so that any random variable can be written in the form Y =
f(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) for f a suitable Borel-measurable function.
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This means
that the optimal nal portfolios Y
i
= f
i
(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) for some appropriate
functions f
i
. In order to avoid trivialities, we assume that F
X
is complete, i.e.,
augmented with all the P - null sets.
Second, unless the functional  on L
2
is linear, arbitrage would be possible.
To see this, consider the case where e.g., (Z + Y ) > (Z) + (Y ) for any two
random variables Z and Y in L
2
. Since we assume innite divisibility of any
portfolio, a reinsurer could insure the bundle (Z +Y ), and then reinsure Z and
Y separately. The cash ows from these trades would be
(Z + Y )  ((Z) + (Y )) > 0
at time 0, and  (Z + Y )(!) +Z(!) + Y (!) = 0 at time 1 for any ! 2 
. Thus
the reinsurer has made a risk-free prot whatever the state of nature, which
should not be possible in any consistent model of this market. Thus it must be
the case that  is linear, i.e., it satises
(aZ + bY ) = a(Z) + b(Y )
for any constants a; b 2 R and random variables Z; Y 2 L
2
.
Third, the pricing functional  should be positive, meaning simply that
(Z)  0 for any Z  0 P-a.s. In other words, a random variable that is
non-negative with probability 1, should have a non-negative market price.
From functional analysis it is known that a positive, linear functional on an
L
p
-space is bounded (1  p < 1), and hence also continuous, in which case
we can use the Riesz representation theorem and conclude that there exists a
unique random variable  2 L
2
such that
(Z) = E(Z) for all Z 2 L
2
:
This random variable, the Riesz representation, we shall sometimes refer to as
the state-price deator. At the moment we can only conclude that there exists
2
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a Borel-measurable function f such that  = f(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) holds for the
Riesz representation . Our aim is now to characterize this particular f , and
also the f
i
-functions corresponding to the optimal Y
i
; i 2 I. The following
notational convention will be used: If X and Y are two random variables, then
by X  Y we mean that (Y  X)  0 P-a.s., i.e., the random variable (Y  X)
is non-negative almost surely.
Denition 1 An allocation Z = (Z
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
) is called feasible if
I
X
i=1
Z
i

I
X
i=1
X
i
:= X
M
:
The problem each agent is supposed to solve is the following:
sup
Z
i
2L
2
Eu
i
(Z
i
) subject to (Z
i
)  (X
i
): (1)
An important issue is, of course, existence (and uniqueness) of solutions to (1).
We shall not elaborate on this here, suÆce it is to note the following: If
fZ
i
2 L
2
: Eu
i
(Z
i
) <1; (Z
i
)  (X
i
)g
is bounded (in L
2
-norm), then existence is guaranteed.
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Also, a strictly concave
u
i
suÆces for uniqueness.
Denition 2 A competitive equilibrium is a collection (;Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) con-
sisting of a price functional  and a feasible allocation Y = (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) such
that for each i, Y
i
solves the problem (1) and markets clear;
P
I
i=1
Y
i
=
P
I
i=1
X
i
.
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We close the system by assuming rational expectations. This means that the
market clearing prices  implied by agent behavior is assumed to be the same
as the price functional  on which agent decisions are based. The main analytic
issue is then the determination of equilibrium price behavior.
In the microeconomic literature there are colorful descriptions of how such
an equilibrium might result, involving e.g., the Walrasian auctioneer, in the
case of no uncertainty. In the reinsurance market it is perhaps more realistic to
think of bilateral trades between reinsurers.
We notice that the concept of Walrasian equilibrium is widely employed in
consumer theory, although the analysis can be hard and the conclusions require
consumers who are extraordinarily sophisticated. There is, however, a lot of
experimental evidence, where a number of researchers have attempted to see
whether markets perform under controlled conditions in the way economists
assume they do. The results obtained are usually striking in their support of
Walrasian equilibrium.
When an insurer is invited to cover a large risk, he may decide that he
cannot, or does not want to do so entirely. He may rather cover merely part of
the risk, say a fraction, against the corresponding part of the premium. This
3
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4
Market clearing is usually dened by
P
I
i=1
Y
i

P
I
i=1
X
i
. Since we have strictly mono-
tonic preferences, equality will result in equilibrium.
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leaves the insurer to seek other insurers in the market who are willing to accept
the rest of the risk. From the 1680's he knew that he could nd these other
insurers at the coee house of Edward Lloyd in London.
Lloyd's of London still operates in this way. To buy insurance at Lloyd's
one has to contact a broker who is accredited at Lloyd's. The broker takes a
\slip", which contains all relevant information about the risk, to one or more
underwriters who specializes in risks of this type. The underwriter who oers
the best terms, will set a rate and accept to cover a certain part of the risk. The
broker will next contact other underwriters until the slip is lled. Usually these
underwriters will follow the rate set by the \leading underwriter", but that may
not be the case.
The procedure described above may seem cumbersome, and it can be costly.
It serves, however, to illustrate how the competitive equilibrium (CE) of Deni-
tion 2 may result, or be well approximated, in practice for a reinsurance market.
One is lead to believe that the notion of a CE may be especially fruitful for this
type of markets, and gives reasonable predictions of what prices \ought" to be.
Finally let us comment on the assumption of homogeneous beliefs. This
assumption seems reasonable for a reinsurance market, where trade is tradition-
ally supposed to take place under the conditions of umberrimae dei, and no
information is supposed to be hidden.
Premiums of risks in reinsurance markets are likely to inuence premiums in
the direct market for insurance, where this assumption seems less realistic. The
cause for this may be that the dierent agents have dierent information about
the risks. It seems likely that the buyers of insurance possess more information
about the risk that they try to get rid of, than the insurers. This potential
asymmetric information gives rise to the selection problem or adverse selection.
In addition, the buyers may often directly, or indirectly be able to inuence
events so that the probability distributions of the insured risks are altered.
This may happen because the insurer is usually unable to perfectly monitor all
the actions of the insured, a phenomenon giving rise to moral hazard.
Whereas the problem of moral hazard does not seem of particular importance
in a reinsurance market, the problem of adverse selection may occur since a
ceding company usually has more detailed information about the risks it has
underwritten, and subsequently tries to get rid of in the reinsurance market,
than the reinsurers. It may of course be tempting for a direct insurer to get
rid of some \bad risks". For this reason the reinsurance industry makes use
of a detailed rating system for insurance companies, through e.g., Insurance
Solvency International, which may penalize such actions. If an insurer gets a bad
reputation, he may get a low classication by such rating agencies, implying that
he will face tougher conditions in the reinsurance market, like higher premiums.
The very existence of such rating companies is an indication of the severity of
the selection problem. In any case, we shall abstract from both these problem
areas.
The above model is formulated in terms of a reinsurance syndicate, but other
applications are manifold, since the model is indeed very general. For instance,
X
i
might be the randomly varying water endowments of agricultural region
(or hydro-electric power station) i;
X
i
could stand for nation i's state-dependent quotas in producing diverse
pollutants (or in catching various sh species);
5
X
i
could account for uncertain quantities of dierent goods that trans-
portation rm i must bring from various origins to specied destinations;
X
i
could be the initial endowments of shares in a stock market, in units of
a consumption good.
This latter application we will return to in some detail later. For instance,
the present formulation allows us to emphasize and study the concept of com-
plete nancial markets, and the economic value, or rather the rationale behind
contingent claims, such as e.g., options and futures contracts.
3 The characterization of a competitive equilib-
rium
In this section we characterize a CE assuming that it exists. In the literature
cited at the end the reader will nd several references to the existence issue.
5
We take it that the initial portfolios are not identically equal to zero, and that
a unique equilibrium exists. We also assume quite naturally that (X
i
) > 0 for
each i. In fact, it seems reasonable that each agent is required to bring to the
market an initial \endowment" of positive value.
6
In this case we have the
following:
Theorem 1 Suppose the preferences of the agents are monotonic, i.e., u
0
i
> 0
for all i 2 I. The equilibrium is then characterized by the existence of positive
constants 
i
, i 2 I, such that for the equilibrium allocation (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
)
u
0
i
(Y
i
) = 
i
; a:s: for all i 2 I; (2)
where  is the Riesz representation of the pricing functional .
Proof Recall that max
Z
i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) s.t. h(Z
i
)  0, where h(Z
i
) := (Z
i
) (X
i
),
is a nice optimization problem: The objective is concave and the constraint
function h (the feasible set) is convex. For such problems the Kuhn-Tucker
Theorem says that, granted a suitable constraint qualication, any optimal so-
lution Y
i
will be supported by a Lagrange multiplier 
i
: That is, there exists

i
 0 such that the Lagrangian
L
i
(Z
i
;
i
) = Eu
i
(Z
i
)  
i
h(Z
i
)
is maximal in Z
i
at Z
i
= Y
i
. Moreover, complementary slackness holds: 
i
h(Y
i
) =
0. The said qualication could be h(Z
0
i
) < 0 for some Z
0
i
. (This is the so called
Slater condition.) Here let Z
0
i
=
1
2
X
i
.
Next we explore what maximality of L
i
(; 
i
) at Y
i
means. For that purpose
dene a variation
~
Y
i
:= Y
i
+tZ where Y
i
is the optimal solution of (1), t 2 R is a
scalar dummy variable and Z 2 L
2
is an arbitrary random variable. According
to our conditions the function f(t; Z) := L
i
(
~
Y
i
;
i
) attains its maximum for
t = 0 for all Z 2 L
2
, and consequently must
f
0
(0; Z) = EfZ(u
0
i
(Y
i
)  
i
)g = 0 for all Z 2 L
2
; (3)
5
Existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibria in innite-dimensional settings seems to have been
rst treated in Bewley (1972).
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This is of course a weaker requirement than the positivity assumption X
i
 0 P-a.s. for
all i found in consumer theory.
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which implies that u
0
i
(Y
i
)  
i
 = 0 a.s.
Finally, since u
0
i
> 0 for all i, the shadow price  > 0 a.s., otherwise the
problem (1) can not have a solution, contrary to our assumption that an equi-
librium exists. From the rst order condition (2) it then follows that 
i
> 0 of
all i. 
Notice that in an equilibrium of the above type only relative prices are
determined. We get
u
0
i
(Y
i
(!))
u
0
i
(Y
i
(!
0
))
=
(!)
(!
0
)
for almost all !; !
0
2 
:
Thus the rate of substitution between states of nature is constant across the
agents.
Consider an equilibrium where  = (
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
I
) are the associated pos-
itive constants. Then the same equilibrium is obtained for the ray ^ = c for
c > 0 a positive scalar. In the latter case all the prices are obtained from the
former after multiplication by the constant 1=c. Thus the equilibrium allocation
(Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) remains invariant to multiplication of the ray  by a normaliz-
ing constant c. In general prices are determined by a unique equilibrium only
modulo a normalization.
One should perhaps not loose touch with the situation of the more familiar
Euclidean space. If the set of states of the world 
 is nite, we are basically
back in nite dimensional Euclidean space, if we take proper care of the state
probabilities. The result of this theorem is then analogous to the geometri-
cal interpretation that the state-price vector is a suitable normalized positive
vector orthogonal to the budget sets of the agents. More precisely, for almost
every state the realized marginal utility is (ex-post) perpendicular to the real-
ized budget set. There is an important point here. The utility maximization
within budget yields an expected marginal utility Eu
0
i
(Y
i
) which is normal to
the expected budget set, i.e., Eu
0
i
(Y
i
) = 
i
(1) for some 
i
 0. The more
interesting fact is that this condition disintegrates to have u
0
i
(Y
i
) = 
i
 almost
surely.
One should observe that several main features of the geometrical interpre-
tations from Euclidean spaces carry over to the present Hilbert space L
2
. For
example, the argument leading to equation (3) is very simple and intuitive, and
can of course be more formally explained in terms of directional derivatives : We
dene
5L
i
(Y
i
; Z) = lim
t#0
+
L
i
(Y
i
+ tZ;
i
) L
i
(Y
i
;
i
)
t
;
where5L
i
(Y
i
; Z) is called the directional derivative of L
i
(Y
i
;
i
) in the direction
Z. L
i
is dierentiable at Y
i
means that 5L
i
(Y
i
; Z) exists for all Z 2 L
2
, and
the functional Z ! 5L
i
(Y
i
; Z) is linear. This functional, the gradient of L
i
at
Y
i
, is denoted by 5L
i
(Y
i
). It can here be shown to be given by
(5L
i
(Y
i
))(Z) = Ef(u
0
i
(Y
i
)  
i
)Zg: (4)
A necessary condition for a maximum of L
i
at Y
i
is that the linear functional
in equation (4) is zero in all directions Z, which leads directly to the condition
(2).
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We now present an example:
Example 1. Consider the case with negative exponential utility functions,
with marginal utilities u
0
i
(z) = e
 z=a
i
; i 2 I, where a
 1
i
is the absolute risk
aversion of agent i, or a
i
is the corresponding risk tolerance. Using the charac-
terization (2), we get

i
e
 Y
i
=a
i
= ; a:s:; where 
i
= 
 1
i
; i 2 I:
After taking logarithms in this relation, and summing over i, market clearing
implies
 = e
(K X
M
)=A
; a:s: where K :=
I
X
i=1
a
i
ln
i
; A :=
I
X
i=1
a
i
:
Furthermore, from the same rst order conditions we also get that the optimal
portfolios can be written
Y
i
=
a
i
A
X
M
+ b
i
; where b
i
= a
i
ln
i
  a
i
K
A
; i 2 I:
Thus the reinsurance contracts involve optimal sharing rules which are aÆne
in X
M
. Contracts of this type belong to the class of proportional reinsurance.
The constants of proportionality a
i
=A are simply equal to to each agent's risk
tolerance, measured relative to the market. In order to compensate for the
fact that the least risk-averse reinsurer will hold the larger proportion of the
market, zero-sum side payments occur between the reinsurers, here represented
by the terms b
i
. Without these side payments an agent, with a \small" initial
endowment but with a large risk tolerance, would end up with a \large" nal
endowment, but this could not possibly be consistent with his budget constraint.
This kind of treaty seems common in reinsurance practice.
In order to determine the ray  = (
1
; : : : ; 
I
), we employ the budget con-
straints:
E(Y
i
e
(K X
M
)=A
) = E(X
i
e
(K X
M
)=A
); i 2 I;
which give that
b
i
=
EfX
i
e
 X
M
=A
 
a
i
A
X
M
e
 X
M
=A
g
Efe
 X
M
=A
g
; i 2 I:
Hence the optimal sharing rules Y
i
are completely determined in terms of the
given primitives of the model. Now the ray  can also be determined modulo a
normalization. Letting K =
P
I
i=1
a
i
ln
i
denote this normalization, then

i
= e
b
i
=a
i
e
K=A
; i 2 I:
If we impose the normalization Efg = 1 of the state price deator, we obtain
e
 K=A
= Efe
 X
M
=A
g, in which case the constants  are given by

i
=
e
b
i
=a
i
Efe
 X
M
=A
g
; i 2 I:
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Through this example we discovered a \pricing principle", since market prices
are now given by
(Z) =
EfZ  e
 X
M
=A
g
Efe
 X
M
=A
g
; for any Z 2 L
2
: (5)
Prices given by an expression like (5) are sometimes referred to as the \Esscher
principle" in actuarial mathematics, but then with the important distinction
that the aggregate market indexX
M
in (5) is substituted by the risk Z itself. For
this latter principle the price rule is of course no longer a linear functional, which
then can, unfortunately, lead to arbitrage possibilities and other anomalies.

In the above example we were able to completely specify the equilibrium,
given that the relevant expectations are well dened. We may safely conjecture
that if the side payments b
i
's can be computed, an equilibrium exists and is
unique.
We notice that both the optimal, nal portfolios Y
i
and the state-price
deator  depend upon the initial portfolios X
i
only through the aggregate
X
M
=
P
I
i=1
X
i
. In other words,  = f(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) = g(X
M
), and
Y
i
= f
i
(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) = g
i
(X
M
) for some functions g and g
i
. One may won-
der how general this is. In this particular example g turned out to be smooth,
and the g
i
-functions are even linear. We know that non-proportional reinsur-
ance is another of the main classes of contracts prevailing in real reinsurance
markets, so the linearity of the contracts may not be all that general.
Before we investigate these matters any further, we introduce the concept of
(strong) Pareto optimality of an allocation.
Denition 3 A feasible allocation Y = (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is called Pareto optimal
if there is no feasible allocation Z = (Z
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
) with Eu
i
(Z
i
)  Eu
i
(Y
i
)
for all i and with Eu
j
(Z
j
) > Eu
j
(Y
j
) for some j.
A famous neoclassical result is that any competitive equilibrium is Pareto
optimal, sometimes also termed eÆcient. Not surprisingly, the same result
obtains here:
Theorem 2 Suppose (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Then it is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let (;Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) denote the equilibrium, and suppose that Z is a
Pareto dominating allocation. Since Eu
j
(Z
j
) > Eu
j
(Y
j
) for some j, it must be
the case that (Z
j
) > (Y
j
) for these j. Consider the other i where we only have
equality in expected utilities. It must be the case that (Z
i
)  (Y
i
) also for
these i. Suppose the opposite. Then by local insatiability (and a fortiori by strict
monotonicity) any such agent i would be able to achieve a larger expected utility
that Eu
i
(Y
i
) by using all the available budget (Y
i
), implying that the resulting
expected utility would be strictly larger than Eu
i
(Y
i
), and the corresponding
allocation meats the budget constraint, a contradiction to the optimality of Y
i
.
Accordingly we have that (Z
i
)  (Y
i
) for all i, and with strict inequality for
some j. But then
(
I
X
i=1
X
i
)  (
I
X
i=1
Z
i
) =
I
X
i=1
(Z
i
) >
I
X
i=1
(Y
i
) = (
I
X
i=1
Y
i
) = (
I
X
i=1
X
i
);
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a clear contradiction. The rst inequality in the above string follows since Z is
feasible and  is positive and linear, the strict inequality follows from what has
just been demonstrated, and the last equality follows since Y clears the market.
Hence Y must be Pareto optimal. 
In consumption theory the preceding theorem is known as First Welfare
Theorem.
4 The characterization of a Pareto optimum
A consequence of the last theorem is that Pareto optima are also characterized
by the equations (2), at least those allocations that are also equilibria. It turns
out that this include most Pareto optima. Before we show this, we turn to
another useful characterization of Pareto optimum. Here we shall employ a
version of one of the most useful mathematical tools in microeconomics, The
Separating Hyperplane Theorem: Suppose X and Y are convex, disjoint subsets
of R
I
. Then there exists a non-trivial linear functional  on R
I
such that
(x) =
P
I
i=1

i
x
i

P
I
i=1

i
y
i
= (y) for all x 2 X and y 2 Y . Moreover, if
x 2 int(X) or y 2 int(Y ) then (x) < (y). In the following we assume that
all the portfolios Z  c, where c is some constant. In a one-period model, if we
interpret the portfolio of an agent as \wealth", it may sometimes be diÆcult to
give any meaning to negative wealth, which then necessitates an assumption of
this kind where c = 0. We now show the following.
Theorem 3 Suppose u
i
are concave and increasing for all i. Then Y is a
Pareto optimal allocation if and only if there exists a nonzero vector of agent
weights  2 R
I
+
such that Y = (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) solves the problem
sup
(Z
1
;::: ;Z
I
)
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) subject to
I
X
i=1
Z
i

I
X
i=1
Y
i
= X
M
: (6)
Proof. First, assume (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is Pareto optimal, and dene two sets A
and B in R
I
as follows:
A := fa 2 R
I
: a
i
 Eu
i
(Z
i
) Eu
i
(Y
i
); i 2 I; Z 2 Zg
where Z denotes the set of feasible allocations Z = (Z
1
; : : : ; Z
I
) such that
P
Z
i
 X
M
, and B := fb 2 R
I
+
: b 6= 0g. Then the set A is convex, since all
the u
i
are assumed concave, and A \ B = ;, since Y is Pareto optimal. Thus
we know that there exists a separating hyperplane, i.e., there exists a vector
 2 R
I
,  6= 0 such that   a    b 8 a 2 A and b 2 B. Given the nature of
B,  can not have a negative coordinate, hence   0. Since 0 2 cl(B) we have
that a  08a 2 A, thus
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
) 
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
); 8Z 2 Z ;
which is the conclusion.
The other direction is easy to show. 
The fact that some of the weights 
i
may be zero in the characterization
of Theorem 3 may be illustrated as follows: Imagine sharing a cake between I
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persons having increasing utilities across the whole cake. Then any split of the
cake is in fact Pareto optimal, including the \sharing" giving the whole cake
to one single person. This corresponds to only the weight of this person being
positive, all the other weights being zero. In this case the concept of Pareto
optimality is void, but that is not the typical case with multiple goods and/or
many states of the world.
5 Representative agent pricing
In this section we introduce the representative agent, and demonstrate what
implications he has for the pricing of insurance contracts, as well as for how the
optimal contracts are obtained.
We have already briey met this agent in equation (6) of Theorem 3: Con-
sider for each nonzero vector  2 R
I
+
of agent weights the function u

() : R! R
dened by
u

(v) := sup
(z
1
;::: ;z
I
)
I
X
i=1

i
u
i
(z
i
) subject to
I
X
i=1
z
i
 v: (7)
As the notation indicates, this function depends only on the variable v, meaning
that if the supremum is attained at the point (y
1
; : : : ; y
I
), all these y
i
= y
i
(v)
and u

(v) =
P
I
i=1

i
u
i
(y
i
(v)). It is a consequence of the Implicit Function
Theorem that under our assumptions, the function u

() is two times dieren-
tiable in v. In particular it follows that u
0

(v) =
P
I
i=1

i
u
0
i
(y
i
(v))y
0
i
(v), and
hence that all the functions y
i
(v) are also dierentiable in v. More importantly
in the present situation, we want to show that for appropriate  the function
u
0

(v) = g(v) = (v), i.e., there is a direct connection to the state-price deator.
Accordingly we are interested in the problem
Eu

(V ) := sup
(Z
1
;::: ;Z
I
)
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) subject to
I
X
i=1
Z
i
 V: (8)
where Z
i
2 L
2
for all i.
Theorem 4 Assume u
0
i
> 0; u
00
i
 0 for all i, and suppose (;Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is
a competitive equilibrium. Then
(i) There exists a nonzero vector of agent weights  = (
1
; : : : ; 
I
), 
i
 0
for all i, such that the equilibrium allocation (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) solves the allocation
problem (8) at V = X
M
=
P
I
i=1
X
i
in which case Eu

(X
M
) =
P
I
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
).
(ii) There exists a nonzero vector of agent weights  = (
1
; : : : ; 
I
), where

i
 0 for all i, such that (;X
M
) is an equilibrium in the single-agent economy
(u

;X
M
). The linear pricing functional  is then given by
(Z) = E(u
0

(X
M
)  Z) 8Z 2 L
2
;
that is u
0

(X
M
) =  a.s.
Remarks: 1) The equilibrium in the single agent economy must be understood
as a consistency requirement, since \the representative agent" has no one to
trade with.
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2) The importance of the single agent theory in our setting is that this con-
struction enables us to nd the prices in the original economy, since  is the
same in these two economies. The convenience of accommodating a representa-
tive agent is related to the fact that an equilibrium problem thus reduces to an
optimization problem.
3) We now see that the Riesz representation, the state price deator, or
the shadow price  = u
0

(X
M
), so  = f(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) = g(X
M
) is true
in general, for X
M
=
P
I
i=1
X
i
, and the function g(x) = u
0

(x); x 2 R , is
determined from (7).
4) Given the probability distribution function F , the optimal equilibrium
allocations Y
i
depend on the initial portfolios (X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) only through
the aggregate X
M
=
P
I
i=1
X
i
as well, or Y
i
= f
i
(X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) = g
i
(X
M
) is
true in general, since Y
i
= (u
0
i
)
 1
(
i
) follows directly from the characterization
in Theorem 1, and  depends only on the aggregate risk X
M
as just noticed.
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Proof of Theorem 4 It follows from Theorem 1 that there exist Lagrange
multipliers 
i
> 0 such that Y
i
solves the problem
sup
Z2L
2
Efu
i
(Z)  
i
(Z  X
i
)g; (9)
and the budget conditions thus hold with equality, i.e., E(Y
i
) = E(X
i
); 8i.
Now choose 
i
=
1

i
;8i. For any feasible (Z
1
; : : : ; Z
I
) we then have
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
) =
I
X
i=1

i
(Efu
i
(Y
i
)  
i
(Y
i
 X
i
)g) 
I
X
i=1

i
(Efu
i
(Z
i
)  
i
(Z
i
 X
i
)g) =
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) 
I
X
i=1
Ef(Z
i
 X
i
)g 
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
):
The rst inequality follows from (9), and the second follows from the feasibility
of (Z
1
; : : : ; Z
I
) and the positivity of  a.s. Thus we have found a set of strictly
positive agent weights 
i
such that (Y
1
; : : : ; Y
I
) solves allocation problem (8) at
V = X
M
=
P
I
i=1
X
i
.
Next, in order to prove (ii) we must show that no trade is optimal in the
single agent economy, where the agent has utility index u

() and initial portfolio
X
M
. If this were not the case, there would 9Z
M
6= X
M
such that
Eu

(Z
M
) > Eu

(X
M
) and E(Z
M
)  E(X
M
):
From the denition of u

, this would imply the existence of an allocation
(Z
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
) with
P
Z
i
 Z
M
such that
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) >
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
)
7
The function (u
0
i
)
 1
(x) denotes the inverse function of u
0
i
(x), which exists for all i ac-
cording to our assumptions.
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and
I
X
i=1

i

i
E(Z
i
) = E(
X
Z
i
)  E(Z
M
)  E(X
M
) =
I
X
i=1

i

i
E(X
i
):
Putting these two inequalities together we get
I
X
i=1

i
[Eu
i
(Z
i
)  
i
Ef(Z
i
 X
i
)g] >
I
X
i=1

i
[Eu
i
(Y
i
)  
i
Ef(Y
i
 X
i
)g] ;
which contradicts the fact that (Y
i
) solves the problem (9).
It remains to show that  = u
0

(X
M
). From (ii) we know that X
M
is the
solution of the problem
sup
Z2L
2
Eu

(Z) subject to (Z)  (X
M
);
where the Lagrangian is given by
L(Z;) = Eu

(Z)  (E(Z)  E(X
M
)):
By the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem a necessary (and suÆcient) condition for opti-
mality of X
M
is given by the rst order condition
u
0

(X
M
) = ; a:s:;
which now follows precisely as in the proof of Theorem 1. Notice that u
0

(X
M
) >
0 a.s. follows from strict monotonic preferences of all the reinsurers, and  > 0
a.s. must hold since the present optimization problem is known to have a
solution. Hence  > 0,  =
1

u
0

(X
M
) a.s., and by a renormalization we now
have that u
0

(X
M
) =  
A consequence of Remark 4) above is that the reinsurers can hand in all their
initial portfolios X
i
to a pool, and after ! 2 
 is realized, let the pool's clerk
distribute parts of the total X
M
(!) back to the syndicates members according
to the optimal sharing rules Y
i
(!) = g
i
(X
M
(!)). In this respect the competitive
solution contains, perhaps surprisingly, an element of cooperation, i.e., that of
pooling.
6 The existence of optimal allocations
In this section we provide conditions for the existence of a Pareto optimum, and
we also briey study the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
The extent to which a Pareto optimal allocation can also be considered as
a competitive equilibrium is the contents of our rst theorem. In the theory of
consumption it is known as The Second Welfare Theorem:
Theorem 5 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, let (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) be a
Pareto optimal allocation. Then there exists a re-allocation (
~
X
1
;
~
X
2
; : : : ;
~
X
I
),
satisfying
P
~
X
i
=
P
Y
i
= X
M
, such that Y
i
solves
sup
Z
i
2L
2
Eu
i
(Z
i
) subject to E(Z
i
u
0

(X
M
))  E(
~
X
i
u
0

(X
M
)) (10)
for all i, where the function u
0

is dened through (8) with V = X
M
a.s., and
the nonzero weights  follow from the characterization in Theorem 3.
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Proof. Under our assumptions we know that there exists a nonzero vector  2
R
I
+
of agent weights such that
Eu

(X
M
) =
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
): (11)
(These weights are used to dene the function u
0

in (10).) We have to show
that (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) satises (10). Suppose the opposite, i.e., for each feasible
(
~
X
1
;
~
X
2
; : : : ;
~
X
I
),
P
~
X
i
= X
M
, there exists a feasible allocation (Z
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
),
satisfying the budget constraints in (10), and which is not equal to (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
)
a.s., such that for all i
Eu
i
(Z
i
)  
i
Efu

(X
M
)(Z
i
 
~
X
i
)g  Eu
i
(Y
i
)  
i
Efu

(X
M
)(Y
i
 
~
X
i
)g;
(12)
for all 
i
, where the inequality is strict for at least some j. In particular these
inequalities hold for 
i
= 1=
i
(we may use the usual convention that10 = 0.
8
Now we have that
I
X
i=1

i

i
E(u
0

(X
M
)Z
i
) = E(u
0

(X)
I
X
i=1
Z
i
)  (13)
E(u
0

(X
M
)
I
X
i=1
~
X
i
) =
I
X
i=1

i

i
E(u
0

(X
M
)
~
X
i
)
Further, for the same -vector we have
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) =
I
X
i=1

i
h
E(u
i
(Z
i
)  
i
Efu
0

(X
M
)(Z
i
 
~
X
i
)g
i
>
I
X
i=1

i
h
E(u
i
(Y
i
)  
i
Efu
0

(X
M
)(Y
i
 
~
X
i
)g
i
=
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
)
for all market clearing
~
X-allocations. The rst equality follows since both the
Z- and
~
X- allocations are feasible with equality, the inequality follows from the
two inequalities (12) and (13) put together, and the last equality follows since
the Y -allocation is feasible with equality, i.e.,
P
Y
i
=
P
~
X
i
=
P
Z
i
= X
M
,
and 
i

i
= 1 for all i. But this is contrary to the fact that (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is
Pareto optimal. 
Remark. Let us note here that Karl Borch (1960, 62) used a slightly dier-
ent denition of Pareto optimality than our Denition 3. In his denition no
exchange is to be carried out unless all reinsurers gain from it:
Denition 4 A feasible allocation Y = (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is (weakly) Pareto op-
timal if there is no feasible allocation Z = (Z
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
) with Eu
i
(Z
i
) >
Eu
i
(Y
i
) for all i.
8
Note that if we avoid \corner allocations", i.e., situations where some Y
i
= 0 a.s., we may
safely assume that 
i
> 0 for all i.
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Borch then showed that, under our conditions u
0
i
> 0; u
00
i
< 0 for all i, an
allocation (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) is (weakly) Pareto optimal in the sense of Denition
4 if and only if
u
0
i
(Y
i
) = k
i
u
0
1
(Y
1
); a:s: for all i 2 I; (14)
where k
1
= 1 and k
i
> 0 for all i,
9
or equivalently, if and only if (2) holds
with constants 
i
> 0 for all i. Matti Ruohonen (1979) has further shown that,
under our conditions on the u
i
-functions, this theorem is also true for (strong)
Pareto optimality of our original Denition 3. Thus these two denitions are
equivalent under our conditions. This equivalence fails when not all the u
i
are strictly monotonic, while the theorem remains valid for the (strong) Pareto
optimality of Denition 3. 
Using theorems 3 and 5 we may now say something about the existence of
a competitive equilibrium. We note that the allocation problem (6) is also a
nice optimization problem. According to the Saddle Point Theorem, granted a
suitable constraint qualication, any optimal solution Y will be supported by a
(stochastic) Lagrange multiplier (X
M
) 2 L
2
. That is, there exists a random
variable (X
M
) with nite variance, (X
M
)  0 a.s., such that the Lagrangian
L(Z
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
;(X
M
)) = Ef
I
X
i=1

i
u
i
(Z
i
)  (X
M
)
I
X
i=1
(Z
i
 X
i
)g
is maximal in Z at Z = Y . Moreover, complementary slackness holds. The rst
order conditions for this optimization problem are:

i
u
0
i
(Y
i
) = (X
M
) a:s: 8 i; (15)
which are seen to be identical to the rst order conditions (2) of Theorem 1
with some reinterpretations. Here the Lagrange multiplier (X
M
) associated
with the problem (6) can be seen to be the same as the Riesz representation
(X
M
) in the pricing representation for a competitive equilibrium, or, what we
have also called the state price deator, and, as usual 
i
= 1=
i
. This explains
Karl Borch's characterization of a Pareto optimal solution: Given the existence
of a solution to the allocation problem (6), a necessary and suÆcient condition
for a Pareto optimum is given, under our assumptions, by the conditions in (15).
We argue in terms of directional derivatives: Dene
5L((Y
1
; : : : ; Y
I
); (Z
1
; : : : ; Z
I
)) =
lim
t#0
+
L(Y
1
+ tZ
1
; : : : ; Y
I
+ tZ
I
;(X
M
)) L(Y
1
; : : : ; Y
I
;(X
M
))
t
;
where 5L(Y; Z) is the directional derivative of L(Y ;(X
M
)) in the direction
Z = (Z
1
; : : : ; Z
I
). L is dierentiable at Y = (Y
1
; : : : ; Y
I
) now means that
5L(Y; Z) exists for all Z
i
2 L
2
; i = 1; 2; : : : ; I , and the functional Z !
5L(Y; Z) is linear. This functional, the gradient of L at Y , we denote by
5L(Y ). It is given by
(5L(Y ))(Z) = Ef
I
X
i=1
(
i
u
0
i
(Y
i
)  (X
M
))Z
i
g: (16)
9
A detailed technical proof of this theorem is provided by DuMouchel (1968). Note that
these authors have disregarded corner solutions.
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A necessary condition for a maximum of L at Y is that the linear functional in
equation (16) is zero in all directions Z, which leads directly to the condition
(15).
One may now wonder if there exist Pareto optimal solutions to the risk ex-
change problem in the rst place. This problem has been studied by DuMouchel
(1968), who has shown that if all u
0
i
(x) are continuous and the ranges of the
functions 
i
u
0
i
(x) have a common, non-empty intersection, then this problem
has a solution. These conditions for the existence of a Pareto optimal solution
are very weak indeed. In particular, in the case treated here - where all the
utility functions are strictly monotonic - we can always choose the 
i
> 0, pro-
vided we stay away from corner solutions, such that there is a Pareto optimal
solution. Thus there will also exist a competitive equilibrium, possibly after a
re-allocation of the initial portfolios X
i
.
6.1 The existence of an equilibrium
Given an initial allocation X = (X
1
; : : : ; X
I
), one would presume that each
reinsurer would require at least individual rationality, i.e.,
Eu
i
(Y
i
)  Eu
i
(X
i
); 8i; (17)
for the nal allocations Y
i
, i = 1; 2; : : : ; I . This requirement will naturally
exclude many of the Pareto optimal points, which do not really take into account
improvements from the initial portfolios X
i
, only taking as its point of reference
the aggregate X
M
.
A competitive equilibrium satises individual rationality, and we now turn
to the existence of an equilibrium for the given initial portfolios. This subject
happens to be a rather delicate matter, usually requiring x-point theorems or
other rather technical, mathematical machinery. Matters are further compli-
cated by the innite dimensionality of the space L
2
. Since the interior of L
2
+
is
empty, we will usually have problems to nd a non-zero pricing functional us-
ing separation arguments, since e.g., the separating hyperplane cannot be used
directly in this situation. Note, however, that we have not insisted that our
portfolio space is L
2
+
. We will not elaborate on this issue here, but shall be
content with referring to one theorem in this regard.
Mas-Colell (1986) has come up with a concept called properness which can
be used in the present model. Returning to our conditions behind Theorem 1,
the following has been shown (Aase (1993a)), which we present without proof:
Theorem 6 Suppose u
0
i
> 0; u
00
i
< 0, and (X
i
) > 0 for all i. If X
M
> 0 a.s.,
and there exists an allocation Z, Z
i
 0 a.s., with
P
I
i=1
Z
i
= X
M
a.s. and
E(u
0
i
(Z
i
))
2
<1 for all i, then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
It seems natural to check the initial portfolio X if it satises the above
requirements. Note that it follows from the above theorem and from Theorem 1
that if X
i
 0 a.s. and E(u
0
i
(X
i
))
2
<1, for all i, then an equilibrium allocation
Y exists such that E(u
0
i
(Y
i
))
2
<1 for all i, since we know that  2 L
2
. Let us
consider some examples.
Example 2. We return to the situation in Example 1, and assume that each
X
i
is exponentially distributed with parameter 
i
, i 2 I. SinceX
M
=
P
X
i
> 0
16
a.s., the requirements for the existence of an equilibrium are satised since
u
0
i
(X
i
) = exp( X
i
=a
i
) and
E (u
0
i
(X
i
))
2
= E

e
 
2
a
i
X
i

=

i

i
+ 2=a
i
<1 for all i
for the risk tolerance parameters a
i
> 0.
Now consider the normal distribution, and assume that each X
i
is N (
i
; 
i
)-
distributed, and furthermore that X is jointly normal. In this case
E (u
0
i
(X
i
))
2
= E

e
 
2
a
i
X
i

= exp
 
2
 

i
a
i

2
  2

i
a
i
!
<1 8 i:
However, the positivity requirements are not met. Still all the computations
of the equilibrium are well dened, the state-price deator (X
M
) is a strictly
positive element of L
2
+
, and prices can readily be computed. We conclude that
an equilibrium exists even if the positivity requirements are not satised. It
may admittedly be unclear what negative wealth should mean in a one period
model, but aside from this there are no formal diÆculties with this case as long
as utility is well dened for all possible values of wealth.
Suppose that each X
i
is Pareto distributed with probability density function
(see e.g., Johnson et. al. (1994))
f
X
i
(x) =

i
c

i
i
x
1+
i
; c
i
 x <1; 
i
; c
i
2 (0;1):
This is known as the Pareto distribution of the rst kind, also borrowing its
name from the Italian-born Swiss professor of economics, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-
1923). In this case EX
i
exists only if 
i
> 1, and varX
i
exists only if 
i
> 2,
etc. The moment generating functions '
i
() = Ee
X
i
of these distributions
exist for   0, so the above criteria are met for Z = X . Accordingly, for these
distributions a competitive equilibrium exists. 
We now turn to the case the case where the relative risk aversions of all the
reinsurers are constants:
Example 3. Consider the case of power utility, where u
i
(x) = (x
1 a
i
 1)=(1 
a
i
) for x > 0; a
i
6= 1 and u
i
(x) = ln(x) for x > 0 and a
i
= 1, where the natural
logarithm results as a limit when a
i
! 1. This example only makes sense in the
no-bankruptcy case where X
i
> 0 a.s. for all i. The parameters a
i
> 0 are then
the relative risk aversions of the agents, which are given by positive constants
for this class of preferences.
Consider rst the case where a
1
= a
2
= : : : = a
I
= a. Here all the marginal
utilities are given by u
0
i
(x) = x
 a
, and using Theorem 1 we get
u
0
i
(Y
i
(X
M
) = 
i
(X
M
); a:s: for all i;
which implies that Y
i
(X
M
) = 
 1=a
i
(X
M
)
 1=a
, a.s., and using the market
clearing X
M
=
P
i2I
Y
i
(X
M
), a.s., we get
u
0

(X
M
) = (X
M
) = (
X
i2I

1=a
i
)
a
X
 a
M
a:s:;
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where 
i
= 1=
i
, showing that the marginal utility of the representative agent
is of the same type as that of the individual agents. The optimal sharing rules
are linear, and given by
Y
i
(X) =

1=a
i
P
j2I

1=a
j
X
M
a:s: for all i:
The weights 
i
are determined by the budget constraints, implying that

i
= k

E(X
i
X
 a
M
)
E(X
1 a
M
)

a
; i 2 I;
or, 
i
is determined modulo the proportionality constant k = (
P
j2I

1=a
j
)
a
for
each i.
If we normalize such that E(u
0

(X
M
)) = 1 we nd that k = 1=E(X
 a
M
) and
the \pricing principle"
(Z) =
E
 
Z X
 a
M

E(X
 a
M
)
; for any Z 2 L
2
(18)
results.
When it come to existence, let us check our criterion in the case where all
the X
i
are exponentially distributed. In this case we have to check the integrals
E(X
 2a
i
i
) =
Z
1
0
x
 2a
i

i
e
 
i
x
dx <1;
which converge (near zero) when a
i
< 1=2. An equilibrium may still exist
outside this region depending upon the stochastic interdependence between the
initial portfolios. Empirical studies suggest that the interesting values of a
i
may
be in the range between one and three, say.
Let us consider a situation where there exists a feasible allocation Z as in
Theorem 6, where the Z
i
components are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with
parameter . Let X = AZ where A is an I  I-matrix with elements a
i;j
satisfying
P
i
a
i;j
= 1 for all j, so that X
M
=
P
I
i=1
Z
i
:= Z
M
. This yields an
initial allocation X of dependent portfolios, which we must require in a realistic
model of a reinsurance market, and it means that the X
i
portfolios are mixtures
of exponential distributions with a fairly arbitrary dependence structure. Now
it turns out that we can still compute the 
i
-weights in the region a < I . In
this case X
M
has a Gamma distribution with parameters I and , and the
expectations E(X
1 a
M
) and E(Z
i
X
 a
M
) both exist for a < I   1. In order to
verify this, we note that the joint distribution of Z
i
and X
M
is given by the
probability density
f(z
i
; x) = 
2
e
 x
((x   z
i
))
I 2
(I   2)!
; z
i
 x <1; 0  z
i
<1:
So we have to check the integral
E(Z
i
X
 a
M
) =
Z
1
0
Z
1
z
i
z
i
x
 a

2
e
 x
((x   z
i
))
I 2
(I   2)!
dz
i
dx:
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The possible convergence problem is seen to occur around zero, and the standard
test yields that when (1  a+ I   2) >  1, this integral is nite. From this it is
obvious that the expectations E(X
i
X
 a
M
) also converge in the same region, by
the linearity of expectation, since the X
i
=
P
j
a
i;j
Z
j
.
Similarly we have to check the following expectation:
E(X
1 a
M
) =
Z
1
0
x
1 a
e
 x
(x)
I 1
(I   1)!
dx:
Near zero the possible problem again occurs, and the standard comparison test
gives convergence when (1  a+ I   1) >  1. So when I > maxfa; a  1g = a,
both expectations exist, suggesting that an equilibrium will also exist in the
interesting region for the parameter a when the number of reinsurers I  4.
Let us consider the case of Pareto distributions as well. Now the integrals
E(X
 2a
i
i
) =

c
2a
i
i
(1 +
2a
i

i
)

 1
<1:
Since min
i2I

i
> 0 there are no problems with convergence, and an equilibrium
exists in this case regardless of the values of the relative risk aversion parameters.
In this latter case all the portfolios are bounded away from zero which helps
on the existence problem for power utility, while the exponential distribution
has more probability mass near zero, potentially causing some problems with
existence of equilibrium. 
When sharing rules are aÆne, it is possible to to reach a Pareto optimum by
an exchange of fractions of the initial portfolios, sometimes also with zero-sum
side payments. AÆne sharing rules are optimal when the individual utility in-
dices are members of the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class. In
a reinsurance market this means that there should be no need for more than the
standard proportional reinsurance contract when this is true. Applied to a stock
market the assumption means that there should be no need for trading other
securities than ordinary shares (common stock). Non-proportional reinsurance
and securities such as contingent claims (e.g., options) both exist and are im-
portant, so we must conclude that the preferences of the decision makers are
at least so diverse that they can not be represented by HARA-utility functions
only. For some reason many economists used to refer to a market in which it
is impossible to reach a Pareto optimum through an exchange of proportions of
the initial portfolio as an \incomplete market".
Our next example illustrates a situation where the Pareto optimal sharing
rules are not aÆne:
Example 4. Consider power utility when the exponents are not equal, e.g.,
u
i
(x) = x
a
i
; a
i
2 (0; 1); i 2 I. The rst order conditions give
Y
i
(X) =

u
0

(X
M
)

i
a
i

1
(a
i
 1)
a:s: i 2 I;
where the state-price deator is implicitly determined by the market clearing
condition, and the budget constraints determine the agent weights modulo a
normalizing constant.
19
Consider the special case where I = 2; a
1
= 1=2; a
2
= 3=4. The marginal
utility of the representative agent equals
u
0

(X
M
) =
 
p
h+
p
h+ 4X
M
2X
M
!
1=2
a:s:
where we have arbitrarily set 
2
= 3=4, which we can do since only the ratio of
the two weights matters. Here
h =

a
1
a
2

1

2

4
:
In this case the optimal sharing rules are
Y
1
(X
M
) =
1
2

p
h
2
+ 4hX
M
  h

; Y
2
(X) = X
M
+
1
2

h 
p
h
2
+ 4hX
M

;
a.s. Finally, one of the budget constraints is now enough to determine the
remaining unknown constant h, in which case everything is determined in terms
of the primitives of the model. 
It should be clear that this Pareto optimum can not be achieved by an
exchange of proportional reinsurance contracts.
7 Risk tolerance and aggregation
The risk tolerance function of an agent (x) : R ! R
+
, is dened by the
reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion function R(x) =  
u
00
(x)
u
0
(x)
, or (x) =
1=R(x). There is a neat result connecting the risk tolerances of all the agents in
the market to the risk tolerance of the representative agent in a Pareto optimal
allocation. It goes as follows: In a Pareto optimum we know that
u
0
i
(Y
i
(x)) = 
i
u
0

(x); x 2 R:
Because of our smoothness assumptions, both sides of the above equation are
real, dierentiable functions a.e. (the right-hand-side because of the implicit
function theorem), so taking derivatives of both sides gives
u
00
i
(Y
i
(x))Y
0
i
(x) = 
i
u
00

(x); x 2 R:
Dividing the second equation by the rst, we obtain the following non-linear
dierential equation for the Pareto optimal allocation function Y
i
(x):
Y
0
i
(x) =
R

(x)
R
i
(Y
i
(x))
; x 2 R; (19)
whereR

(x) =  
u
00

(x)
u
0

(x)
is the absolute risk aversion function of the representative
agent, and R
i
(Y
i
(x)) =  
u
00
i
(Y
i
(x))
u
0
i
(Y
i
(x))
is the absolute risk aversion of agent i at the
Pareto optimal allocation function Y
i
(x), i 2 I. Since
P
i2I
Y
0
i
(x) = 1, we now
get by summation in (19)


(X) =
X
i2I

i
(Y
i
(X
M
)) a:s:; (20)
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or in words, the risk tolerance of the market equals the sum of the risk tolerances
of the individual agents in a Pareto optimum. The above result has been found
by Borch (1985); see also Bhlmann (1980) for the special case of exponential
utility functions.
Example 5. Returning to Example 1 where u
0
i
(x) = e
 x=a
i
for all i 2 I, we
get that 
i
(x) = a
i
for all x 2 R, i.e., the risk tolerance function of each agent
is a constant. Using the result (20), we get that 

(x) =
P
i2I
a
i
= A for all
x, also a constant. That 

(x) = A can easily be veried by going back to
Example 1, where we showed that u
0

(x) =  = exp((K   x)=A): 
Imagine that agent j is risk neutral, meaning that 
j
(Y
j
) = 1, while the
others are risk averse. From the result (20) it follows that 

=1 as well, i.e.,
the representative agent is then also risk neutral. From the relation (19) it may
be seen that this implies that Y
0
j
(x) = 1 for all x, meaning that agent j will
then carry all the risk in the market. In other words, we have shown that in a
Pareto optimum all risk should be carried by the risk neutral participant.
Example 6. In order to illustrate this last point, consider a case where
u
1
(x) = x and u
2
(x) = 2
p
x, and I = 2. Here agent 1 is risk neutral. The
rst order conditions give
1 = 
1
;
1
Y
2
(X
M
)
= 
2
; a:s:
implying that  =
1

1
, a constant, and
p
Y
2
(x) =

1

2
=

2

1
, another constant.
The optimal sharing rules are thus
Y
1
(X
M
) = X
M
 


2

1

2
; Y
2
(X
M
) =


2

1

2
; a:s:
and the utility function of the representative agent is given by
u

(x) = 
1
Y
1
(x) + 
2
2
p
Y
2
(x) = 
1
x+

2
2

1
:
Thus from two risky projects brought to the market having payos X
i
, i = 1; 2,
the risk neutral agent takes all the risk, leaving a xed amount, or a deterministic
salary, to the risk averse agent. The representative agent is seen to be risk
neutral in accordance with the above theory, and the state-price deator  =
u
0

(X
M
) = 
1
, a constant. The budget constraints determine the ratios between
the agent weights as follows:

2

1
=
p
E(X
2
):
If we normalize such that Eu
0

(X
M
) = 1, then since  = u
0

(X
M
) = 
1
, 
1
= 1
and 
2
=
p
E(X
2
). 
One may wonder what happens when more than one agent is risk neutral.
In the above example, if both agents are risk neutral they can not both assume
all the risk. In this case the risk neutral agents as a group presumably end up
with all the risk, where they are indierent to any split of the total risk among
them that does not change each individual's expected payo.
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8 Insurance premiums
The foregoing has been formulated in terms of portfolios and market values
of net reserves. To obtain market premiums of insurance contracts, we note
the net reserves of insurer i consists of assets a
i
less of liabilities Z
i
under the
insurance contracts held by the insurer. Assume for simplicity that the assets
a
i
are riskless. Then we may apply the foregoing theory to
X
i
= a
i
  Z
i
; i 2 I:
We note that the market values of the initial portfolios can be written
(X
i
) = a
i
  (Z
i
) = a
i
 E (u
0

(a  Z
M
)Z
i
) ;
where a =
P
a
i
and Z
M
=
P
Z
i
. We may dene the market disutility of claim
payments by the function v

(z), where v
0

(z) = u
0

(a z). From our assumption
it follows that v

(x) is a decreasing function in z and v
00

(z) =  u
00

(a  z) > 0.
The above formula simply says that the market value of the insurer's portfolio
is equal to his riskless assets less the market premium for insurance of the
liabilities. This formula makes it easy to translate results expressed in terms of
values of net reserves into insurance premiums. Notice in particular that if for
some portfolio X
i
the market value (X
i
) < E(X
i
), then we get from the above
formula that the corresponding insurance premium (Z
i
) > E(Z
i
) so that the
economic risk premium ((Z
i
) E(Z
i
)) of this insurance contract is positive.
Using the normalization Ev
0

(a   Z
M
) = 1, (meaning that the risk-free in-
terest rate equals zero), we nd that the risk premium can in general be written
as follows:
(Z
i
) E(Z
i
) = cov (Z
i
; v
0

(Z
M
)) : (21)
Since the marginal disutility of the representative agent is an increasing function
of z, from (21) one may be led to believe that for claims Z
i
that are positively
correlated with the aggregate claims Z
M
in the market, the risk premium is
positive, and for claims that are negatively correlated with Z
M
the risk pre-
mium is negative. This is, however, only true in general when (Z
1
; : : : ; Z
I
) is
multinormally distributed. There exist joint distributions for the claims where
this may not be true. Here one has to remember that covariance is a measure of
linear statistical dependence, and can accordingly only be considered as a good
measure of \stochastic association" under multinormality.
One can of course argue that in insurance an assumption of joint normality
is not very realistic, since for once claims can only be non-negative. We may
therefore be reluctant to use the nice theoretical results obtainable from this
assumption in insurance. Here we must remember, however, that the normal
distribution is commonly used with great success to model a number of quan-
tities, like the heights, or weights of recruits, and many other quantities which
are clearly non-negative. The point is that the resulting parameter estimates
will usually yield a completely negligible probability of falling in the forbidden
regions. This is one of the reasons why we still nd it fruitful to return to
the situation with a multinormal distribution for the net reserves in the next
section.
Although the present reformulation is straight-forward, one has to be careful
when modeling claim size distributions. In practice insurance claims are always
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nite, and models where claim sizes are bounded seem natural, but it is of-
ten convenient to use standard continuous probability distributions with known
properties on unbounded supports, as we have just argued.
For example, if we let Z
i
be Pareto distributed as in Example 2, where we
have negative exponential utility functions, our test cannot guarantee existence
of equilibrium. If the claim sizes are instead exponentially distributed, existence
is only guaranteed if a
i
> 2
i
for all i, while for normally distributed claims
existence is more or less guaranteed in this situation. This is another reason for
studying the multinormal case separately.
For power utility none of these distributions can be employed directly, un-
less we set the utility equal to zero when the argument becomes negative, i.e.,
substitute the argument x in u(x) by j x j
+
. In the latter case we may run into
existence problems if too much probability is attached to the zero point.
As a conclusion to our equilibrium pricing theory so far, we note the follow-
ing: Premiums of a risk Z in a reinsurance market must typically depend on:
(i) The stochastic properties of the risk itself. (ii) The stochastic relationship
between the particular risk Z and claims in the market as a whole, described
by the covariance between v
0

(Z
M
) and Z. (iii) The attitude towards risk in
the market as a whole, represented by v
0

(Z
M
). (iv) The total assets of all the
insurers in the market, represented by a.
A realistic theory of insurance premiums must of course take all these four
elements into account. This is, however, rarely done in actuarial risk theory.
Several books have been written on insurance premium principles, some even
recent, where only the rst of these four elements are covered. This is also the
case for current articles published in scientic journals dealing with actuarial
theory.
9 Risk adjustments of the probability measure
In the contemporary literature one often encounters market prices computed as
a discounted, expected value of the nal payos of an asset, the expectation
being taken with respect to another probability measure than the one originally
given. This is particularly true in many nancial models, where the setting is
not that of risk neutrality. We now relate our pricing results to this tradition,
and investigate if there is anything to be gained by making this transformation.
In the formulation of our theory we have assumed that there exists a risk-
less security, X
1
say, such that X
1
(!) = 1 a.s. with market price (X
1
) =
Eu
0

(X
M
) := d := 1=(1 + r
f
), dening the equilibrium interest rate r
f
through
the discount factor d. Consider  := u
0

(X
M
)=d. Clearly E() = 1 and the
pricing rule can be written:
(Z) =
1
1 + r
E(Z  ) for any Z 2 L
2
; (22)
Under our assumptions P [u
0

(X
M
) > 0] = 1 and d > 0, and we dene a set
function Q as follows:
Q(A) =
1
d
Z
A
u
0

(X
M
(!))dP (!); A 2 F :
It is then clear that the following three properties hold for Q: (a) Q(
) = 1,
(b) Q([
i
A
i
) =
P
i
Q(A
i
) whenever fA
i
g is a disjoint countable collection of
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members of F , and (c) Q(A)  0 for all A 2 F . Property (a) follows since
E() = 1, property (b) is a consequence of the corresponding property of the
abstract integral which denes Q, and (c) follows from the almost sure positivity
of . Thus Q is formally a probability measure which is mutually absolutely
continuous with respect to the given measure P , or in standard mathematical
notation, Q P and P  Q, or Q  P . This means that if P (B) = 0 for any
B 2 F , then Q(B) = 0 and if Q(A) = 0 for any A 2 F , then P (A) = 0. Here 
is the Radon Nikodym derivative of Q with respect to P , or
(!) =
1
d
u
0

(X
M
(!)) =
dQ(!)
dP (!)
: (23)
Notice that in our setting Q is only formally a probability measure, meaning
that if A 2 F is any event such that Q(A) > 0, then Q(A) is not really the
probability of the event A if Q(A) 6= P (A), since we have assumed that all
the agents agree on the probability measure P . The measure Q can instead be
thought of as a risk adjusted probability measure. The pricing functional  can
be expressed as a discounted expected value under the measure Q:
(Z) =
1
1 + r
EfZ  g =
1
1 + r
Z


Z(!)(!) dP (!):
Using (23), this can be written
(Z) =
1
1 + r
Z


Z(!)dQ(!) =
1
1 + r
E
Q
(Z); Z 2 L
2
; (24)
where the symbol E
Q
obviously signies the expectation operator under the
measure Q. After having adjusted for the time depreciation of money, market
prices are computed as expectations under Q. This would correspond to a world
of only risk neutral agents having probability assessments given by Q. In order
to calculate market prices we thus carry out to adjustments: First we deate all
risks by the discount factor d adjusting for the time depreciation of money, i.e.,
one dollar received today is preferred to one dollar received tomorrow. Second
we deate all risks by , meaning adjusting for risk aversion.
10
The expected
value of the nal result is then the market value.
Now, are there any advantages to introducing the risk adjusted measure Q?
In our one-period model the answer is no. In general the expression in (22) will
suÆce to compute prices, i.e., discount by the state-price deator u
0

(X
M
) and
take expectation, but there may be situations where it is relatively easy to nd
the probability distribution of the risk Z under the measure Q, in which case it
may simply be more convenient to use the expression (24), since we are usually
well trained in taking expectations of random variables.
This is in particular true for certain multiperiod models, e.g., time continu-
ous models of nancial economics, when the primitive risks X are modeled by
Ito-diusions. In this situation one has a powerful theorem due to Girsanov
giving a recipe how to nd the state prices using Q, and in particular how these
can be linked to the primitives of the model, in which case there is also a clear
conceptual advantage to the introduction of Q.
10
Naturally these two steps are the same as just deating once by the state-price deator
u
0

(X
M
).
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10 An Insurance version of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model
We may now derive some very simple and elegant results based on two as-
sumptions: (i) An interior equilibrium exists; and (ii) X = (X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
) is
multinormally distributed.
Let us quickly recall the properties we make use of. The random vector X is
said to be multinormally distributed if any linear combination Y =
P
i2I
a
i
X
i
of
elements of X is normally distributed, for any set of real constants a
1
; a
2
; : : : a
I
.
Suppose X is multinormally distributed, and consider any two linear com-
binations Y =
P
i2I
a
i
X
i
and Z =
P
i2I
b
i
X
i
. Then (Y; Z) is binormally
distributed.
Consider the linear relation X = +Y +U , where X , Y and U are random
variables and  and  real constants. If (X;Y ) is binormally distributed, then
U = X   ( + Y ) is normally distributed according to the above denition.
Also, by the above result (U; Y ) is binormally distributed, and so is (U;X).
We will also need a result called Stein's lemma after Charles Stein. It goes
as follows: Suppose that (X;Y ) is binormally distributed, and let g : R! R be
a real function such that Efg(Y )g exists. Then
(a) cov(X; g(Y )) =
cov(Y; g(Y ))
varY
cov(X;Y ):
If in addition the derivative g
0
() exists for all reals and E j g
0
(Y ) j<1, then
(b) E (g
0
(Y )) =
cov(Y; g(Y ))
varY
:
A very simple proof of this result can be found in Aase (1993a). Since it builds
upon the above observations, let us present a version here:
Proof of Stein's lemma: Between any two random variables X and Y , pos-
sessing the appropriate moments, the following relationship holds:
X = + Y + U
where cov(Y; U) = 0 and
 =
cov(X;Y )
varY
;  = EX   EY:
Thus we have quite generally
cov(Y; g(Y )) = cov(Y; g(Y )) + cov(U; g(Y )):
By the above remarks, since (X;Y ) is binormally distributed, so is (Y; U) and
cov(Y; U) = 0. Because of the binormality, this implies that Y and U are indeed
independent random variables, which implies that U and g(Y ) are also indepen-
dent, and thus cov(U; g(Y )) = 0. Accordingly cov(X; g(Y )) =  cov(Y; g(Y )),
which is the conclusion in (a).
The (b) part of the result is shown using integration by parts, where the
functional form of the normal probability density f
Y
(y) =
1
p
2
Y
e
 
1
2
2
y
(y 
Y
)
2
of Y must explicitly be employed. 
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Notice that the \covariance orthogonality" between the random variable
Y and the remainder term U is not quite enough to conclude that the term
cov(U; g(Y )) = 0. This is precisely where the (bi)normality is vital for the
conclusion.
Returning to the equilibrium characterization, we maintain our previous
assumptions regarding the smoothness of the utility functions of the agents.
Denote Efu
0

(X
M
)g = d =
1
1+r
. Then our general equilibrium pricing result,
applied to the initial portfolios X
i
, can be written
(X
i
) = dEX
i
+ cov(X
i
; u
0

(X
M
)); i = 1; 2; : : : ; I:
From Stein's lemma it follows that
(X
i
) = dEX
i
+E(u
00

(X
M
))cov(X
i
; X
M
); i = 1; 2; : : : ; I:
Summation over the agents gives (X
M
) = dEX
M
+ E(u
00

(X
M
))varX
M
, and
elimination of the term E(u
00

(X
M
)) in these two equations nally yields the
CAPM:
(X
i
)  dEX
i
=
cov(X
i
; X
M
)
varX
M
((X
M
)  dEX
M
); i = 1; 2; : : : ; I: (25)
The interpretation of this relationship is: The risk premium of the portfolio X
i
equals the portfolio's \beta" times the risk premium of the market portfolio
X
M
.
Note that this insurance version of the CAPM is in general only valid for
the given initial portfolios. This is in contrast to the CAPM in a stock market,
where the corresponding relationship is also valid for any portfolio of stocks. If,
however, the nal optimal sharing rules Y
i
are aÆne, then the CAPM will also be
valid for these, since multinormality is maintained under aÆne transformations.
In this case we get
(Y
i
)  dEY
i
= E (Y
0
i
(X
M
)) ((X
M
)  dEX
M
); i = 1; 2; : : : ; I; (26)
where
Y
0
i
(X
M
) =
R

(X
M
)
R
i
(Y
i
(X
M
)
> 0 a:s:
under our assumptions. Thus, if the optimal sharing rules are aÆne, the corre-
sponding betas are strictly positive, which is the analogue of the following result
in a stock market: \In the CAPM eÆcient portfolios have positive betas". When
only aÆne sharing rules result, it also corresponds to the observation: \Investors
hold eÆcient portfolios in CAPM", eÆcient here referring to portfolios on the
portfolio frontier above the minimum variance portfolio.
Notice that the beta of the original portfolios may be both positive and
negative. What would a negative beta mean? Because of risk aversion the
quantity ((X
M
)  dEX
M
) < 0, so the market would nd such a portfolio, say
X
i
, so valuable, that it would accept a negative expected return in equilibrium:
(EX
i
  (X
i
))=(X
i
) < 0. Such an asset would come in handy when really
needed, namely when the rest of the market is down, which accounts for its
relatively high market value. It is noteworthy that our relatively simple theory
can capture this kind of wisdom.
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11 A Game Theoretic Approach to the Risk Al-
location Problem
11.1 Introduction
Game theory was created to generalize the behavioral assumptions usually made
in neo-classical economic theory. Some of these assumptions may appear unre-
alistic, or at least seem to require a large degree of sophistication on behalf of
the reinsurers. The assumption of rational expectations leaves the reinsurers as
\price takers", yet it is their very actions that determine the prices. A justica-
tion for price taking is usually that there is a very large number of participants
in the market, and none of them acting alone can inuence the prices to any
signicant degree. Example 3 showed a situation where an equilibrium existed
only if the number of participants exceeded a certain xed number. In the
following we shall give a brief and oversimplied presentation of the essential
elements in the game theoretical approach.
Assume that the game has I players, let I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig and let S be
an arbitrary subset of I. The characteristic function of the game, v(S) is a
real-valued function dened for any S  I. The function v(S) gives the total
payo which the players in S - belonging to the \coalition" S - can obtain by
cooperating.
The characteristic function is superadditive, i.e., v(S [ T )  v(S) + v(T ),
where S and T are disjoint subsets of I. This means that the players can not
loose by cooperation.
Let z
i
be the payo to player i in the outcome of the game. The relevant
behavioral assumptions in terms of game theory are:
I
X
i=1
z
i
= v(I): (27)
This represents \collective rationality", which we usually refer to as eÆciency,
and implies that the players will cooperate so that they obtain the maximum
total payo. The assumption corresponds to Pareto optimality in our reinsur-
ance market, i.e., there exists a non-negative vector of agent weights  6= 0 such
that the optimal solution Y solves
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
) = Eu

(X
M
):
Next consider the condition
z
i
 v(fig): (28)
This represents \individual rationality", and implies that no player will partic-
ipate in the game if he can do better in splendid isolation. The assumption
corresponds to Eu
i
(Y
i
)  Eu
i
(X
i
) in the reinsurance market. The two assump-
tions dene the set of payo vectors which constitute the \imputations" of the
game.
It is natural to assume that the corresponding rationality assumptions hold
for all coalitions, not just for the one-player coalition, and for the coalition of
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all players. This suggests the following assumption
X
i2S
z
i
 v(S) (29)
for all S  I. The latter condition we may refer to as social stability. It means
that no coalition S  I could improve its members' outcome by splitting away
from the others. In our reinsurance market the condition would correspond to
a further restriction on the investor weights  6= 0 such that
X
i2S

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
)  Eu

(X
S
)
where
Eu

(X
S
) := sup
Z
i
X
i2S

i
Eu
i
(Z
i
) s:t:
X
i2S
Z
i

X
i2S
X
i
:= X
S
:
The set of payo vectors which satises (29) is called the core of the game,
a concept introduced by Gillies (1959). The core appears as a very attractive
solution concept for a general game, but it has the unpleasant property of being
empty for large classes of games. For a three-person game let us make a trans-
formation of the origin so that v(fig) = 0 for i = 1; 2 and 3. The core is then
dened by nonnegative solutions of
z
1
+ z
2
 v(f1; 2g)
z
1
+ z
3
 v(f1; 3g)
z
2
+ z
3
 v(f2; 3g)
z
1
+ z
2
+ z
3
= v(f1; 2; 3g)
We see hat this system has a solution only if
2v(f1; 2; 3g  v(f1; 2g) + v(f1; 3g) + v(f2; 3g): (30)
Note that mere stability is easy to achieve: Simply let the numbers z
i
be so
large that
P
i2S
z
i
 v(S) for all S  I. Thus, not very surprising, the essential
diÆculty resides in the requirement that the total payo be eÆcient and not
distributed excessively.
The fact that the core often does not exist may limit its usefulness in general
game theory, but the concept has proved useful in economic applications of game
theory.
The presentation of some elements of game theory assumes side-payments,
and inter-person comparability of utility. These assumptions are very strong,
but they can be relaxed at the cost of a more cumbersome notation.
A market of pure exchange can be interpreted as a game, as we have indicated
above. The players enter the game with an initial allocation of risks, or goods,
exchange these risks (goods) in the market and end up with a nal allocation
which has a higher utility. One of the original objectives of game theory was
to analyze markets with so few participants that the assumptions behind the
neo-classical competitive equilibrium appear unreasonable.
Debreu and Scarf (1963) have proved that the core of a market game is
non-empty, and that it contains the allocation corresponding to the competitive
equilibrium in the market, if any.
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They further proved that as the number of players increase to innity, the
core will, under certain assumptions, shrink to the competitive equilibrium. This
means that the heroic neo-classical behavioral assumptions used to determine
the competitive equilibrium in an economy may not be necessary. The result
can be reached from the assumptions of rational behavior behind game theory,
i.e., it is not necessary to assume that the agents are \price takers". This really
oers us two ways to the market equilibrium, the conventional one, and the
avenue via the limit of the core in a market game.
Baton and Lemaire (1981a) have determined the core for a special case of
a reinsurance market, in the situation of Example 1 with negative exponential
utilities, assuming in addition that the initial portfolios X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
are in-
dependent. We will return to this example, but we drop their independence
assumption.
Another solution concept which may be useful in the analysis of reinsur-
ance is the bargaining sets introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964). The
bargaining set contains the core, if it is not empty, and a number of other alloca-
tions, which may occur if the players for some reason fail to form the all-player
coalition.
The starting point of the dierent bargaining sets is a \payo conguration",
which consists of a partition I
1
; I
2
; : : : ; I
m
of the set I of all players, and a payo
vector (z
1
; z
2
; : : : ; z
I
). A payo conguration is individually rational if
X
r2I
s
z
r
= v(I
s
); s = 1; 2; : : : ;m
z
r
 v(frg):
The simplest bargaining set consists of all stable individually rational payo
congurations.
Baton and Lemaire (1981b) have determined the bargaining set for some
special cases of a reinsurance market. Their paper seems to be the rst to apply
the theory of bargaining sets to insurance, and the approach may be promising,
for instance if there is some segmentation of the market.
11.2 The core of a reinsurance market
In many competitive markets one is not confronted with a denitive set of
market prices for an arbitrary collection of risks. Instead one often faces a
range of \rational" prices that each may be accepted. This is so in nancial
markets, but also in many other markets there seems to be such a is a \bid-
ask spread". A negotiation process is then needed in order to obtain a nal
transaction at one of these prices. Thus the competitive paradigm may be a
bit too strong, giving sharper predictions of market behavior than is actually
observed.
The usual explanation of such bid-ask spreads are transaction costs, or pos-
sibly asymmetric information, i.e., deviations from our standard model. Let us
mention a specic event: During the summer of 1999 Reuter arranged for euro-
dollar trade with no transaction costs. It was puzzling to some participants to
observe that a bid-ask spread still persisted.
The derivation we oer below is not intended to fully explain such obser-
vations, but we think it is of interest since it is developed entirely within the
neo-classical paradigm. Let us start by an example:
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Example 7. We return to Example 1, where the reinsurers have negative
exponential utility functions of the form
u
i
(x) = (1  a
i
e
 x=a
i
); x 2 R; i 2 I:
The initial portfolios are X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
I
, and the \market portfolio" X
M
we
here denote by X
I
=
P
i2I
X
i
. The all-player coalition results in the Pareto
optimal allocations
Y
i
=
a
i
A
I
X
I
+ b
i
; where b
i
= a
i
ln(
i
)  a
i
K
I
A
I
;
A
I
=
X
i2I
a
i
; and K
I
=
X
i2I
a
i
ln(
i
):
Let K
I
denote a normalization constant.
The \investor weights" 
i
are arbitrary positive constants, and our aim is
to further constrain the value sets of these constants, or equivalently, to impose
constraints on the zero-sum side payments b
i
. Notice that we have also found
the characteristic function of the game, here given by the expected utility of the
of the \representative agent" restricted to any subset S of I:
Eu

(X
S
) = E
 
X
i2S

i
 A
S
e
(K
S
 X
S
)=A
S
!
for any S  I:
First consider individual rationality:
Eu
i
(Y
i
)  Eu
i
(X
i
); i 2 I:
This is equivalent to

i

E(e
 X
I
=A
I
)
E(e
 X
i
=a
)
e
K
I
=A
I
; i 2 I
or
b
i
 a
i
n
ln(E[e
 X
I
=A
I
])  ln(E[e
 X
i
=a
i
])
o
since 
i
= e
b
i
=a
i
e
K
I
=A
I
.
Next consider social stability. Let us restrict attention to the case I = 3.
The core is then characterized by the following inequalities in b
1
; b
2
and b
3
:
(a
1
+ a
2
)E

e
 (X
1
+X
2
)=(a
1
+a
2
)

expf(b
1
+ b
2
+ 2K=A)=(a
1
+ a
2
)g (31)
 a
1
E

e
 X
M
=A

e
 b
1
=a
1
+ a
2
E

e
 X
M
=A

e
 b
2
=a
2
;
(a
1
+ a
3
)E

e
 (X
1
+X
3
)=(a
1
+a
3
)

expf(b
1
+ b
3
+ 2K=A)=(a
1
+ a
3
)g (32)
 a
1
E

e
 X
M
=A

e
 b
1
=a
1
+ a
3
E

e
 X
M
=A

e
 b
3
=a
3
;
30
(a
2
+ a
3
)E

e
 (X
2
+X
3
)=(a
2
+a
3
)

expf(b
2
+ b
3
+ 2K=A)=(a
2
+ a
3
)g (33)
 a
2
E

e
 X
M
=A

e
 b
2
=a
2
+ a
3
E

e
 X
M
=A

e
 b
3
=a
3
;
and
2AEfe
 X
M
=A
g 
(a
1
+ a
2
) expf(b
1
+ b
2
+K=A)=(a
1
+ a
2
)gE

e
 (X
1
+X
2
)=(a
1
+a
2
)

(34)
(a
1
+ a
3
) expf(b
1
+ b
3
+K=A)=(a
1
+ a
3
)gE

e
 (X
1
+X
3
)=(a
1
+a
3
)

(a
2
+ a
3
) expf(b
2
+ b
3
+K=A)=(a
2
+ a
3
)gE

e
 (X
2
+X
3
)=(a
2
+a
3
)

;
where the last inequality corresponds to (30). Finally
P
i2I
b
i
= 0. 
In general the core will be characterized by the Pareto optimal allocations
corresponding to investor weights 
i
in some region restricted by inequalities of
the above kind, in general a polyhedron   int(R
I
+
). Let u
0

(X
M
) correspond
to the state-price deator for some  2 . For an arbitrary risk Z 2 L
2
this will
give rise to a market premium (Z) = EfZ  u
0

(X
M
)g as we have seen earlier.
As  varies in the region  we obtain a set of \rational" prices, and it seems
natural to consider the largest and the smallest of these, the \ask" price and
the \bid" price:

b
(Z) = inf
2
EfZ  u
0

(X
M
)g; 
a
(Z) = sup
2
EfZ  u
0

(X
M
)g:
We now illustrate this by the following situation, describing eÆcient risk
allocation between an insurer and an insurance buyer.
Consider a policy holder having initial capital w
1
, a positive real number, and
facing a riskX , a non-negative random variable. The insured has utility function
u
1
, where u
0
1
> 0; u
00
1
< 0. The insurer has utility function u, u
0
> 0; u
00
 0, and
initial fortune w, also a positive real number. These parties can negotiate an
insurance contract, stating that the indemnity I(x) is to be paid by the insurer
to the insured if claims amount to x  0. It seems reasonable to require that
0  I(x)  x for any x  0, and also that no payments should take place if
there are no claims, i.e., I(0) = 0. The premium p for this contract is payable
when the contract is initialized. Using our established theory for generating
Pareto optimal contracts, we easily deduce that the optimal contract satises
the following dierential equation:
@I(x)
@x
=
R
1
(w
1
  p  x+ I(x))
R
1
(w
1
  p  x+ I(x)) +R(w + p  I(x))
; (35)
where the functions R
1
=  
u
00
1
u
0
1
, and R =  
u
00
u
0
are the absolute risk aversion
functions of the insured and the insurer, respectively.
Some conclusions immediately follow from this equation: If u
00
< 0, we see
that 0 < I
0
(x) < 1 for all x, and together with the boundary condition I(0) = 0,
by the mean value theorem we get that
0 < I(x) < x; for all x > 0;
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stating that full insurance is not Pareto optimal. We notice that the natural
restriction 0  I(x)  x is not binding at the optimum for any x > 0.
We also notice that contracts with a deductible d can not be Pareto optimal
either, since such a contract means that I
d
(x) = x  d for x  d, and I
d
(x) = 0
for x  d for d > 0 a positive real number. Thus either I
0
d
= 1 or I
0
d
= 0,
contradicting 0 < I
0
(x) < 1 for all x.
However, when u
00
= 0 we notice that I(x) = x for all x  0, full insurance
is optimal and the risk-neutral part, the insurer, assumes all the risk. Clearly,
when R is uniformly much smaller than R
1
, this will approximately be true even
if R > 0.
The fact that the classical model can not explain contracts with deductibles
has led some writers, like Gerber (1978) and Buhlmann and Jewell (1979), to
consider so-called \constrained" Pareto optimal risk exchanges, where exoge-
nous constraints have been imposed. This may lead to contracts we observe
in real life. It would of course be more desirable to obtain contracts of, say,
the stop loss type, or XL-reinsurance treaties from more fundamental assump-
tions, and it is by now well known that the introduction of transactions costs,
or including moral hazard may lead to non-trivial deductibles, and coinsurance
above the deductible. We will not, however, discuss these theories in this paper.
Returning to the above situation, we can nd the \competitive equilibrium"
if it exists. Here X
M
= w+w
1
 X , and the budget constraint (Y
1
) = (X
1
),
i.e.,
Ef(w
1
  p X + I(X))u
0

(X
M
)g = Ef(w
1
 X)u
0

(X
M
)g;
implies that the competitive equilibrium premium p = p
ce
is given by
p
ce
=
EfI(X)u
0

(X
M
)g
Efu
0

(X
M
)g
: (36)
As a competitive equilibrium may seem a bit articial in the present situa-
tion, let us instead determine the core. Here the typical core element is given
by (Eu(w+ p  I(X)); Eu
1
(w
1
  p X + I(X)), where the parameter p is con-
strained by the individual rationality requirements, and the indemnity function
I satises (35). Let us determine the relevant interval of p-values: The largest
premium p
a
that the insured will accept is given by
Eu
1
(w
1
  p
a
 X + I
p
a
(X)) = Eu
1
(w
1
 X);
a premium that could result if the insurer is a monopolist. Here I
p
a
(x) is the
indemnity function satisfying (35) for p = p
a
. The smallest premium p
b
that
could result in this situation is given by
Eu(w + p
b
  I
p
b
(X)) = u(w):
One situation where this premium could result is the case with several identical
insurers and many identical customers. Then the price p
ce
would not be stable if
p
ce
> p
b
, as one insurer could attract all the customers by oering insurance at
a slightly smaller price. Other insurers could then repeat this until the premium
p
b
was reached, and further reductions would not be rational as it would lead
to a loss (in expected utility).
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Between these two prices the price p
ce
must lie, i.e., if p
ce
exists, then p
ce
2
[p
b
; p
a
]. Let us now illustrate this by an example.
Example 8. Consider the case where u
1
(x) = 1   e
 ax
and u(x) = 1  
e
 bx
, where a and b are the absolute risk aversion parameters of the insurance
customer and the insurer respectively. In this case we can solve the dierential
equation (35), and the solution is I(x) =
a
a+b
x. Let p
af
= E(I(X)) be the
\actuarially fair" premium, which may be of interest for comparisons. Then the
prices p
b
; p
a
, p
ce
and p
af
are given by
p
a
=
1
a
ln
 
E(e
aX
)
E(e
ab
a+b
X
)
!
; p
b
=
1
b
ln

E(e
ab
a+b
X
)

and
p
ce
=
a
a+ b
E(Xe
X=A
)
E(e
X=A
)
; p
af
= EfI(X)g =
a
a+ b
EfXg;
where A = 1=a+ 1=b.
Assume now that X is exponentially distributed with parameter . Then the
expected utilities of the relevant contracts are well dened if  > maxfa;
ab
a+b
g.
In this case we get that the above prices can be written
p
a
=
1
a
ln
 
1 
ab
a+b
1

1 
a

!
; p
b
=  
1
b
ln

1 
ab
a+ b
1


and
p
ce
=
a
(a+ b)(   1=A)
; p
af
=
a
(a+ b)
;
Here we notice that the indierence premiums p
a
and p
b
both exist if  >
maxfa;
ab
a+b
g, i.e., they exist if the model is well dened. The premium p
ce
exists
when  > 1=A, which also holds if  >
ab
a+b
since 1=A =
ab
a+b
. Thus whenever
the core is well dened, so is the price p
ce
, but note that this is peculiar for our
example, and may not be the case in general.
Let us illustrate by a numerical example. First we choose  = 1, a = 1=2 and
b = 1=8. Here A = 10 and the model is well dened. We obtain that p
a
= 1:176,
p
b
= 0:843, p
ce
= 8=9 = 0:889, and p
af
= 4=5 = 0:80, i.e.,
p
ce
= 8=9 2 [0:843; 1:176] = [p
b
; p
a
]:
Notice that the actuarially fair premium p
af
is not in the core.
Next, consider the case when the insurer is risk neutral. Letting b ! 0 we
obtain that full insurance is optimal, so I(x) = x for all x  0, p
b
= p
af
=
E(I(X)) = E(X), and
p
a
=  
1
a
ln

1 
a


:
The core is [1; 1:386]. Here the actuarially fair premium (= 1) just made it to
the core, and because the insurer is risk averse, he may be willing to pay more
that p
af
= 1. Notice that the competitive equilibrium premium p
ce
= E(X) = 1
as well. 
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Finally we consider the case with constant relative risk aversion.
Example 9. We consider the case of power utility where all the agents have
utility functions of the form u
i
(x) = (x
1 a
  1)=(1   a) for x > 0, where the
a < 1, and (1 a) is the coeÆcient of relative risk aversion. Here the agents are
dierent because the initial portfolios X
i
are. From Example 3 we deduce that
the characteristic function of the game is
Eu

(X
S
) = E
 

(
X
i2S

1=a
i
)
a
X
1 a
S
 
X
i2S

i

=(1  a)
!
for any S  I:
Let
P
i2I

1=a
i
= k
1=a
, where k is a normalization constant. Then individual
rationality gives

i
 k

EX
1 a
i
EX
1 a
I

a=(1 a)
:
For I = 3 social stability can be written

1
 k(a
1;2
+ a
1;3
  a
2;3
)
a
;

2
 k(a
1;2
+ a
2;3
  a
1;3
)
a
;

3
 k(a
1;3
+ a
2;3
  a
1;3
)
a
;
where
a
i;j
=

E(X
i
+X
j
)
1 a
E(X
I
)
1 a

1=(1 a)
for (i; j) 2 f(1; 2); (1; 3); (2; 3)g:
Finally using (30) we have that the investor weights 
i
must also satisfy
2k  (
1=a
1
+ 
1=a
2
)
a
a
1=(1 a)
1;2
+ (
1=a
1
+ 
1=a
3
)
a
a
1=(1 a)
1;3
+ (
1=a
2
+ 
1=a
3
)
a
a
1=(1 a)
2;3
:
By the results of Example 3 the core allocations Y = (Y
1
; Y
2
; : : : ; Y
I
) are then
given by
Y
i
=

1=a
i
k
1=a
X
I
; for all i 2 I;
and 
i
2  dened by the 7 inequalities above. .
12 EÆcient Allocation of Risk: The case of a
Stock Market
12.1 Introduction
Much of the foregoing theory of risk allocation can of course be directly applied
to a stock market. The principal dierence from the risk allocation model we
have considered so far, is that only linear risk sharing is then allowed among
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the given risks. In certain situations this may also be optimal, but by and large
this type of risk sharing can not be Pareto optimal. Still, it is quite plausible
that a competitive equilibrium may exist.
In order to improve the risk sharing between the agents, derivative assets may
be introduced. If we want to complete a model by introducing new securities, we
should make sure that the resulting model really becomes complete, otherwise
the situation may not improve very much, demonstrated by Hart (1975), who
even found examples where the welfare of the agents went down.
Consider the following model. We are given I individuals having preferences
of period one consumption represented by expected utility, where the utility
indices are given by u
i
, i 2 I. There are N securities, where Z
n
is the pay-o
at time 1 of security n, n = 1; 2; : : : ; N .
We suppose individual i is initially endowed with shares of the dierent
securities, so his initial, random endowment is
X
i
=
N
X
n=1


(i)
n
Z
i
;
where


(i)
n
is the proportion of rm n held by individual i. In other words, the
total supply of a security is one share, and the number of shares held by an
individual can be interpreted as the proportion of the total supply held. Denote
by p
n
the price of the security n, n = 1; : : : ; N , where p = (p
1
; p
2
; : : : ; p
N
).
An equilibrium for the economy [(u
i
; X
i
); Z] is a collection (
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
I
; p)
such that given the security prices p, for each individual i, 
i
solves
sup

Eu
i
(Y
i
) (37)
subject to
Y
i
=
N
X
n=1

(i)
n
Z
n
and
N
X
n=1

(i)
n
p
n

N
X
n=1


(i)
n
p
n
; (38)
and markets clear:
I
X
i=1
Y
i
=
I
X
i=1
X
i
=
N
X
n=1
Z
n
: (39)
Denote byM = span(Z
1
; : : : ; Z
N
) := f
P
N
n=1

n
Z
n
, for
P
N
n=1

n
 1g the set of
all possible portfolio payos. We call M the marketed subspace of L
2
(
;F ; P ),
where F = F
Z
:= fZ
1
; Z
2
; : : : ; Z
I
g (all the null sets are included). The
markets are complete if M = L
2
and are otherwise incomplete.
Here we remark that a common alternative formulation of this model starts
out with initial endowments X
i
measured in units of the consumption good, but
there are no outstanding shares, so that the clearing condition is
P
I
i=1

(i)
n
= 0
for all n. In this case we would have F = F
X
. More generally we could let the
initial endowments consist of shares and other types of wealth, in which case
F = F
X;Z
.
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12.2 Arrow securities and complete markets
If there is a nite number of states, so that 
 = f!
1
; !
2
; : : : ; !
S
g, let us denote
the N  S payout matrix of the stocks by Z, where
Z =
0
B
B
B
@
z
1;!
1
z
1;!
2
: : : z
1;!
S
z
2;!
1
z
2;!
2
: : : z
2;!
S
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
z
N;!
1
z
N;!
2
: : : z
N;!
S
1
C
C
C
A
and z
n;!
s
is the payout of common stock n in state !
s
. If N = S and Z is
nonsingular, then markets are complete. It is suÆcient to show that Arrow
securities can be constructed by forming portfolios of common stocks. Since Z
is nonsingular we can dene

(!
s
)
= e
(!
s
)
Z
 1
where e
(!
s
)
= (0; 0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) with 1 at the s-th place. Then 
(!
s
)
Z =
e
(!
s
)
by construction. The portfolio 
(!
s
)
tells us how many shares of each
common stock to hold in order to create an Arrow security that pays \one unit
of account" in state !
s
. It is obvious that as long as Z is nonsingular, we
can do this for each !
s
2 
. Hence a complete set of Arrow securities can be
constructed, and then we know that the market structure is complete.
Markets can not be complete if the random payos Z have continuous distri-
butions, or we have a innite and countable number of states, cases that interest
us. In the nite case, the market can not be complete if the rank of Z is strictly
less than S, the number of states. Consider such a case and allow individuals
to create call and put options on portfolios of common stocks.
Example 10. Suppose
Z =
0
@
2 1
1 3
3 2
1
A
The payo of the market portfolio is (3; 4; 5). Let c
M
(k) denote the price at
date 0 of a European call option on the market portfolio expiring at date 1 with
an exercise price k. The payos for c
M
(3) and c
M
(4) are (0; 1; 2) and (0; 0; 1).
Putting these payos together with the market portfolio, we have the payo
structure
0
@
3 0 0
4 1 0
5 2 1
1
A
which is a nonsingular matrix. Arrow securities can then be constructed by
forming portfolios of the market portfolio and the two call options, so this
market structure is complete. 
This example demonstrates a situation where options can play an allocative
role, and thus be welfare improving. More generally one can show the following:
In an economy where options can freely be created on portfolios of common
stocks, the market is Arrow complete if and only if there exists a portfolio
of common stocks whose payos are dierent in each state, or whose payos
separate.
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12.3 Some general pricing principles
We now consider some general pricing principles. Let there be a stock market in
a single good, single period economy. Agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern
strictly concave and strictly increasing utility functions. Returning to the prob-
lem (37), we substitute the rst constraint into the objective function and form
the Lagrangian of each individual's optimization problem:
L
i
() = E
(
u
i
(
N
X
n=1

(i)
n
Z
n
)  
i

N
X
n=1
p
n
(
(i)
n
 


(i)
n

)
:
The rst order conditions are
@L
i
()
@
(i)
n
= E(u
0
i
(Y
i
)Z
n
)  
i
p
n
= 0;
implying that
p
n
=
1

i
E(u
0
i
(Y
i
)Z
n
); n = 0; 1; : : : ; N:
Dening R
n
= Z
n
=p
n
, the return of asset n, we have that for each i 2 I
1

i
E (u
0
i
(Y
i
)(R
n
 R
m
)) = 0; 8n;m;
or, by the denition of covariance,
1

i
E(u
0
i
(Y
i
))E(R
n
 R
m
) +
1

i
cov(u
0
i
(Y
i
); R
n
 R
m
) = 0 8n;m; (40)
hold for each i 2 I.
Suppose there exists a riskless asset, the 0-th asset, that promises to pay
one unit of the consumption good at date 1 in all states ! 2 
. This asset is
assumed to be in zero net supply. Thus
p
0
=
1

i
E(u
0
i
(Y
i
)  1) :=
1
R
0
:=
1
1 + r
f
for all i 2 I;
where r
f
denotes the risk-free interest rate. Combining this with equations (40)
gives
1
1 + r
f
E(R
n
 R
m
) +
1

i
cov(u
0
i
(Y
i
); R
n
  R
m
) = 0 8n;m; (41)
for all i 2 I. Set m = 0 in this relationship. Then (41) becomes
E(R
n
)  (1 + r
f
) =  (1 + r
f
)cov

u
0
i
(Y
i
)

i
; R
n

; 8n; (42)
saying that the risk premium of any asset in equilibrium is proportional to the
covaiance between the return of the asset and the normalized, marginal utility
of the equilibrium allocation Y
i
for any i of the individuals. This latter quantity
one may conjecture to be equal on M across all the individuals in equilibrium.
We shall look into this conjecture below, but rst we may utilize the relation
(42) to derive the capital asset pricing model.
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12.4 CAPM derived under multinormality
The results of the previous section can now be utilized to derive the standard
CAPM. Two avenues could be chosen: One is to assume that all the individuals
possess quadratic utility functions. This we do not nd plausible in nancial
economics, where the utility is taken over nal consumption, which in a one
period model equals nal wealth. It is highly unlikely to have a satiation point
when it comes to wealth.
The other is to assume that returns of common stocks are multinormally
distributed. Fama (1976) in his book \Foundations of Finance" has repeatedly
tested out this hypothesis on US stocks, and found the assumption acceptable
under certain conditions. This assumption is frequently employed in theoretical
models in nance, such as in the Black and Scholes model, but is frequently
refuted in empirical studies. For the moment, let us nevertheless assume that R
is multivariate normal, and thus that Z is multivariate normal, since the prices
p of the common stocks are all constants at time 0. Using Stein's lemma, from
(42) we get that
E(R
n
)  (1 + r
f
) =  (1 + r
f
)E

u
00
i
(Y
i
)

i

cov(R
n
; Y
i
); 8n; i: (43)
Let Z
M
:=
P
N
n=1
Z
n
and p
M
:=
P
N
n=1
p
n
and consider the weights w
n
:= p
n
=p
M
for n = 1; 2; : : : ; N . Clearly
P
N
n=1
w
n
= 1. By the denition of return, R
M
:=
Z
M
=p
M
signies the return on the market portfolio, and it follows that this
can be written R
M
=
P
N
n=1
w
n
R
n
, i.e., R
M
is the return on the value-weighted
market portfolio. Multiplying (43) by w
n
and summing over the stocks n we
get
E(R
M
)  (1 + r
f
) =  (1 + r
f
)E

u
00
i
(Y
i
)

i

cov(R
M
; Y
i
); 8 i:
Rearranging this equation, summing over the individuals i, and noticing that
cov(R
M
; Z
M
) = var(R
M
)=p
M
, we obtain using the market clearing condition
(39)
(E(R
M
)  (1 + r
f
))
X
i2I

i
Eu
00
i
(Y
i
)
=  (1 + r
f
)
var(R
M
)
p
M
: (44)
Returning to equation (43), rearranging and summing over the individuals, using
again the market clearing condition (39), we get
(E(R
n
)  (1 + r
f
))
X
i2I

i
Eu
00
i
(Y
i
)
=  (1 + r
f
)
cov(R
n
; R
M
)
p
M
: (45)
Finally, we substitute the term
P
i2I

i
Eu
00
i
(Y
i
)
from equation (44) into equation
(45), and the result is:
E(R
n
)  (1 + r
f
) =
cov(R
n
; R
M
)
var(R
M
)
(E(R
M
)  (1 + r
f
)); 8n: (46)
The risk premium of any of the given common stocks, (E(R
n
)   (1 + r
f
)),
is proportional to the corresponding risk premium of the market, (E(R
M
)  
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(1 + r
f
)), where the constant of proportionality 
n
:= cov(R
n
; R
M
)=var(R
M
)
is called the stock's beta. This is the traditional version of the CAPM due to
Mossin, Lintner and Sharpe. Note that we needed no completeness assumption
for this relationship to hold.
Let R

=
P
N
n=1

n
R
n
be the return on any portfolio of common stocks,
where the portfolio weights satisfy
P
N
n=1

n
= 1. Then, from the above it is
trivial to see that
E(R

)  (1 + r
f
) = 

(E(R
M
)  (1 + r
f
)); (47)
where 

:= cov(R

; R
M
)=var(R
M
) is the portfolio's beta. Since only portfolio
formation can be made in this market, we here see a dierence between this
version and the corresponding insurance version presented earlier.
12.4.1 Existence of equilibrium
The problem of existence of equilibrium is, perhaps surprisingly, only dealt
with fairly recently (Nielsen (1987, 1988, 1990a,b), Allingham (1991), Dana
(1999)). Instead of assuming multinormality as we did in the above, a common
assumption in this literature is that the preferences of the investors only depend
on the mean and the variance, in other words, if Z 2M , then a utility function
u
i
:M ! R is mean variance if there exists U
i
: RR! R s.t.,
u
i
(Z) = U
i
(E(Z); var(Z)) for all Z 2M:
The function U
i
is assumed strictly concave and C
2
, increasing in its rst argu-
ment and decreasing in the second.
Consider the following result (Dana (1999):
Theorem 7 Assume that E(X
i
) > 0 for every i = 1; 2; : : : ; I and Z
M
is a non-
trivial random variable (i.e., not equal to a constant a.s.). Then there exists an
equilibrium.
When utilities are linear in mean and variance, we talk about quadratic
utility, i.e., U
i
(x; y) = x  a
i
y; a
i
> 0 for every i. If this is the case, equilibrium
both exists and is unique. In the above it was assumed that utilities were strictly
concave, so quadratic utility only ts into the above framework as a limiting
case.
Let us recall one denition of risk aversion: A preference relation  on a
subset M of L
2
is called risk averse if X  X +Y for any X 2M and non-zero
Y in L
2
satisfying X + Y 2M and E(Y j X) = 0. This means that an agent is
risk averse if the addition of a random prospect that has no incremental eect
on expected value is undesirable.
A related concept is the following: A preference relation  on a subset M
of L
2
is variance averse if X  X + Y whenever X and X + Y are in M and
EY =cov(X;Y ) = 0. This means that an increase in variance is disliked if it
does not aect expected value. In this case quadratic utility is a special case of
a variance averse preference relation.
Suppose that the vector space M has a Hamel basis of jointly normally
distributed random variables. If  is a risk averse preference relation on M , it
follows that  is variance averse. In verifying this, you may notice that if X
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and Y are bivariate normally distributed, then E(XY ) = EX = 0 implies that
E(Y j X) = 0.
In these two examples variance aversion applies because the agent's prefer-
ences are given only in terms of means and variances of an asset, and for a given
mean, more variance is worse. However, nothing in the denition of variance
aversion requires that preferences depend only on mean and variance.
12.5 Incomplete models and allocation eÆciency
In this section we present some nancial models that are not complete, but still
an equilibrium exists and the optimal allocations are Pareto optimal. First we
recall some stylized facts.
The principle of no-arbitrage was introduced shortly in the standard model,
where it was the motivation behind a linear pricing functional. In the reinsur-
ance model we then relied on the assumption of arbitrary contract formation.
We use the following notation. Let X be any random variable. Then by X > 0
a.s. we mean that P [X  0] = 1 and the event f! : X(!) > 0g has strictly
positive probability. In the present setting, by an arbitrage we mean a portfolio
 with p    0 and   Z > 0 a.s., or p   < 0 and   Z  0 a.s. Then we have
the following version of \The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing": There
is no arbitrage if and only if there exists a state-price deator. This means that
there exists a strictly positive random variable  2 L
2
, i.e., P [ > 0] = 1, such
that the market price p

:=
P
N
n=1
p
n

n
of any portfolio  can be written
p

=
N
X
n=1

n
E(  Z
n
):
The proof of this theorem can be found in standard texts, such as e.g., DuÆe
(1996), and relies on the separating hyperplane theorem for cones. The following
result is also useful: There exists a solution to at least one of the optimization
problems (37) of the individuals if and only if there is no arbitrage (see Ross
(1976)).
Remark: The conditions on the utility functional may be relaxed consider-
ably for this result to hold. Consider a strictly increasing utility function U :
L
2
! R. If there is a solution to (37) for at least one such U , then there is
no arbitrage. Conversely, if this U is also continuous, then absence of arbitrage
implies that there exists a solution to the problem (37) for this U . Note that the
utility function U we use is U(X) = Eu(X), i.e., a von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility function.
Clearly, the no-arbitrage condition is a weaker requirement than the exis-
tence of a competitive equilibrium, so if an equilibrium exists, there can be no
arbitrage.
Now, consider a model where an equilibrium exists, so that there is no arbi-
trage, and hence there is a strictly positive state-price deator  2 L
2
. Recall
the optimization problem of Theorem 3:
Eu

(Z
M
) = sup
(Y
1
;::: ;Y
I
)
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
) subject to
I
X
i=1
Y
i
 Z
M
;
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where Y
i
2 L
2
, i 2 I. For u
i
concave and increasing for all i, we know that the
solution to this problem characterizes the Pareto optimal allocations. Consider
the following problem:
E~u

(Z
M
) := sup
(Y
1
;::: ;Y
I
)
I
X
i=1

i
Eu
i
(Y
i
) subject to
I
X
i=1
Y
i
 Z
M
; (48)
where Y
i
2 M , i 2 I. In the situation where a competitive equilibrium exists,
we can proceed along the same lines as in Theorem 4: The rst order conditions
are
Ef(~u
0

(Z
M
)  )Zg = 0 for all Z 2M;
where  > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier. This gives rise to the pricing rule
(Z) =
1

E(~u
0

(Z
M
)  Z) = E(  Z) for all Z 2M:
Similarly, for the problem in (37) the rst order conditions can be written
Ef(u
0
i
(Y
i
)  
i
)Zg = 0 for all Z 2M; i = 1; 2; : : : ; I;
where Y
i
are the optimal portfolios in M for agent i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; I , giving rise
to the market value
(Z) =
1

i
E(Y
i
 Z) = E(  Z) for any Z 2M:
Let us use the notation
~
 =
~u
0

(Z
M
)

; 
i
=
u
0
i
(Y
i
)

i
; i = 1; 2; : : : ; I:
Since M is a closed, linear subspace of the Hilbert space L
2
, if M 6= L
2
then
the model is incomplete. In this case there exists an X in L
2
, X 6= 0, such that
E(X Z) = 0 for all Z 2M . We use the notation X?Z to signify E(X Z) = 0,
and say that X in orthogonal to Z. Also let M
?
be the set of all X in L
2
which
are orthogonal to all elements Z in M . There exists a unique pair of linear
mappings T and Q such that T maps L
2
into M , Q maps L
2
into M
?
, and
X = TX +QX
for all X 2 L
2
. The orthogonal projection TX of X in M is the unique point in
M closest (in L
2
-norm) to X . If X 2 M then TX = X , QX = 0; if X 2 M
?
,
then TX = 0, QX = X .
Using this notation, from the above rst order conditions we have that
(
~
   )?M and (
i
  )?M; i = 1; 2; : : : ; I:
In other words (
~
   ) 2 M
?
and (
i
  ) 2 M
?
for all i and accordingly
T (
~
   ) = 0 and T (
i
  ) = 0 for all i, so the orthogonal projections of ,
~

and 
i
, i = 1; 2; : : : ; I on the marketed subspace M are all the same, i.e.,
T = T
~
 = T
i
; i = 1; 2; : : : ; I: (49)
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The conditions T = T
i
for all i correspond to the necessary conditions  = 
i
for all i in Theorem 1 of an equilibrium, when trade in all of L
2
is unrestricted,
and similarly the condition T = T
~
 corresponds to the necessary condition
 =
~
 in Theorem 4 of the corresponding unrestricted, representative agent
equilibrium.
If an equilibrium exists and M = L
2
, then  =
~
 and the equilibrium al-
locations Y
1
; : : : ; Y
I
are Pareto optimal. In this situation contingent claims in
zero net supply would not have any allocational eects, in other words, such
nancial instruments would not be welfare improving.
If M 6= L
2
the market is incomplete, and two situations can arise:
(a) E~u

(Z
M
) = Eu

(Z
M
) or (b) E~u

(Z
M
) < Eu

(Z
M
).
In situation (b) the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal, which is
likely to be the typical case. Welfare could hence be improved by allowing trade
in non-linear nancial instruments (in zero net supply). One interesting issue
would be to design the minimum set of derivatives required in order to complete
the model.
In situation (a) the \welfare function" E~u

(Z
M
) is equal to its maximal
value, the value it would obtain if trade in all of L
2
was permitted (or possible).
By Theorem 3 the equilibrium allocation is then Pareto optimal. Thus, even if
the market is incomplete, there is no loss of welfare in restricting attention to
the marketed subspace M . If this is the case we call the market allocationally
eÆcient. Here we face the same situation as for a complete market: Contingent
claims in zero net supply would not have any allocational eects, i.e., would not
improve welfare at large (see e.g., Rubinstein (1974), Wilson (1968)).
Let us present a few examples of situation (a). In the rst example the
individuals have constant absolute risk aversions.
Example 11. Consider the case of negative exponential utility functions, with
marginal utilities u
0
i
(z) = e
 z=a
i
; i 2 I, where a
 1
i
is the absolute risk aversion of
agent i, or a
i
is the corresponding risk tolerance. We assume that the payouts of
the stocks Z
i
are continuously distributed random variables, so that the market
is incomplete, and let us assume that an unconstrained equilibrium exists in L
2
.
We know from Example 1 that the equilibrium allocations are given by
Y
i
=
a
i
A
Z
M
+ b
i
; where b
i
= a
i
ln
i
  a
i
K
A
; i 2 I:
where 
i
= 
 1
i
are the agent weights in the representative agent utility function,
the reciprocals of the Lagrangian multiplier 
i
of agent i's individual optimiza-
tion problem, and where the constants K and A are given by
K =
I
X
i=1
a
i
ln
i
; A =
I
X
i=1
a
i
:
The constants b
i
represented the zero-sum side-payments in the reinsurance
application, i.e.,
P
i2I
b
i
= 0.
The question is now whether these allocations can also result in the marketed
subspace M  L
2
. Consider the case where a riskless asset exists, the zeroth
security. Then we may write
Y
i
=
N
X
n=0

(i)
n
Z
n
= b
i
 1 +
N
X
n=1
a
i
A
Z
n
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Thus, if individual i puts the same weight a
i
=A on each of the common stocks
n = 1; 2; : : : ; N and invests 
(i)
0
= b
i
in the riskless security, he will obtain his
unconstrained Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation Y
i
. Notice that the more
risk tolerant an individual is, the more he holds of each of the risky assets. In
order for this to be possible he may borrow or lend the riskfree asset. If, say,
a more risk tolerant investor has a low initial endowment X
i
, he will nance
his optimal portfolio by borrowing, whereas a more risk avers investor will hold
less of the risky assets and more of the riskless, i.e., he may be a lender, at
least if he is initially well endowed. In equilibrium this just adds up, since
P
i2I

(i)
0
=
P
i2I
b
i
= 0.
We notice that the individuals hold varying fractions of the market portfolio
Z
M
and the riskless asset in equilibrium, called two fund separation. 
In the above example, even if the model is incomplete, the individuals obtain
their Pareto optimal allocations by an exchange of common stocks only, so long
as riskfree borrowing and lending is unrestricted. We notice that this could lead
a more risk tolerant, poorly endowed investor to assume a rather risky position
(despite the fact that he is of course risk averse as well).
In the next example we consider the case of constant relative risk aversion.
Here it turns out that risk tolerant and poorly endowed individuals may not
engage in quite so risky positions as in the previous example, and they will do
just ne without a riskfree asset:
Example 12. Here we consider the case of power utility, where u
i
(x) =
(x
1 a
  1)=(1   a) for x > 0; a 6= 1, u
i
(x) = ln(x) if a = 1. The parame-
ter a > 0 is the relative risk aversion of the agents, here assumed equal for all
the individuals. The investors are not equal because their initial endowments
X
i
may be dierent. Again we consider continuous distributions so the model is
incomplete, and we assume an unconstrained equilibrium exists in L
2
. Then we
know from Example 3 that the unconstrained equilibrium allocations are given
by
Y
i
=

1=a
i
P
j2I

1=a
j
Z
M
a:s: for all i:
where again 
i
= 1=
i
, and the investor weights 
i
are determined by the budget
constraints, implying that

i
= k

E(X
i
Z
 a
M
)
E(Z
1 a
M
)

a
; i 2 I;
or, 
i
is determined modulo the proportionality constant k = (
P
j2I

1=a
j
)
a
for each i. The question again is whether these Pareto optimal equilibrium
allocations can be obtained in M  L
2
. Also now the answer is yes. Here agent
i may choose the portfolio weights 
(i)
n
such that
Y
i
=
N
X
n=1

(i)
n
Z
n
=
N
X
n=1

1=a
i
P
j2I

1=a
j
Z
n
;
which means that

(i)
n
=

1=a
i
P
j2I

1=a
j
; n = 1; 2; : : : ; N; 
(i)
0
= 0; i 2 I:
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We see that this equilibrium can be obtained in a market for common stocks only,
where riskfree lending or borrowing is not necessary.
11
Again the individuals
choose the same percentage of each of the stocks, but this time the percentage
is a positive linear functional of the initial endowment X
i
of each individual i,
meaning that someone with a high initial endowment will quite naturally hold
more stocks in equilibrium than someone with a lower endowment.
Here we notice that each individual holds a fraction of the market portfolio
Z
M
in equilibrium. 
We round of this section with a few comments on pricing principles in gen-
eral. Suppose there is no arbitrage. Then there exists a state-price deator
 2 L
2
such that any X 2 L
2
has market price
(X) = E( X):
If there exists an equilibrium in L
2
, we can characterize the state-price deator
as  = u
0

(Z
M
). If the model is not complete and there exists an equilibrium in
the marketed subspace M , we know that  = ~u
0

(Z
M
) on M . In this case
(X) = E (TX  ~u
0

(Z
M
)) +E (QX Q) :
If X 2 M , then X = TX and QX = 0 so the last term in the above pricing
formula disappears. Under this pricing rule, in case (a), if a new nancial asset in
zero net supply is introduced for trade, the original equilibrium inM will not be
upset, and no individual will demand this asset. In case (b) the introduction of
new nancial instruments may change the equilibrium. Consider e.g., the polar
case where the resulting market becomes complete. Then we know that the nal
equilibrium allocations must have changed, since the equilibrium allocations are
now Pareto optimal unlike the original allocations. Some agents will hold other
assets than those in the original stock market economy, and pricing is now under
the rst rule above, i.e.,  on M has changed from ~u
0

(Z
M
) to u
0

(Z
M
).
When it comes to existence of equilibrium in L
2
we have already discussed
this issue in section 6.1. Existence of equilibrium in M we touched upon in
section 12.4 for a special set of preferences. For more general preferences most
results in the literature are only treating the nite dimensional case (Hart (1974),
Werner (1987), Dana and Van (1999)), which is a little outside our focus of
interest. It would be of interest to consider the existence issue in the above
innite dimensional setting.
The idea of restricting attention to the core, instead of requiring a full edged
equilibrium, can be carried out in this nancial model along the lines of section
11, the details being left to the reader.
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